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  • @article{Wright:2004,
    Abstract = {There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we investigate attacks by corrupt group members that degrade the anonymity of each protocol over time. We prove that when a particular initiator continues communication with a particular responder across path reformations, existing protocols are sub ject to the attack. We use this result to place an upper bound on how long existing protocols, including Crowds, Onion Routing, Hordes, Web Mixes, and DC-Net, can maintain anonymity in the face of the attacks described. This provides a basis for comparing these protocols against each other. Our results show that fully-connected DC-Net is the most resilient to these attacks, but it suffers from scalability issues that keep anonymity group sizes small. We also show through simulation that the underlying topography of the DC-Net has affects the resilience of the protocol: as the number of neighbors a node has increases both the communications overhead and the strength of the protocol increase. },
    Author = {Wright, Matthew and Adler, Micah and Levine, Brian Neil and Shields, Clay},
    Journal = {ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)},
    Keywords = {anonymity; peer-to-peer; Journal Paper},
    Month = {November},
    Number = 7, Pages = {489--522},
    Sponsors = {NSF-0080119 and NSF-0087482 and NSF-0296194 and 2000-DT-CX-K001},
    Title = {{The Predecessor Attack: An Analysis of a Threat to Anonymous Communications Systems}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/wright-tissec.pdf},
    Volume = 4, Year = {2004},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/wright-tissec.pdf}}

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