13 results where author includes George Bissias.
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  • @inproceedings{Bissias:2017,
    Url = {http://forensics.cs.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.nspw.2017.pdf},
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and Nikunj Kapadia},
    Booktitle = {Proc. of New Security Paradigms Workshop [draft version was: arXiv:1701.03945]},
    Keywords = {blockchain; security},
    Month = {October},
    Title = {{Securing the Assets of Decentralized Applications using Financial Derivatives}},
    Year = {2017}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @techreport{Bissias:2017a,
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine},
    Address = {Amherst, MA},
    Arxiv_Techrep_Url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.08750},
    Institution = {University of Massachusetts},
    Keywords = {blockchain; security},
    Month = {September},
    Number = {arXiv:1709.08750},
    Title = {{Bobtail: A Proof-of-Work Target that Minimizes Blockchain Mining Variance}},
    Year = {2017}}

    [link]

  • @inproceedings{Ozisik:2017c,
    Author = { A. Pinar Ozisik and Gavin Andresen and George Bissias and Amir Houmansadr and Brian Neil Levine},
    Booktitle = {Proc. of International Workshop on Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology (ESORICS Workshop)},
    Keywords = {blockchain; peer-to-peer},
    Url = {http://forensics.cs.umass.edu/pubs/ozisik.cbt2017.pdf},
    Month = {September},
    Title = {{Graphene: A New Protocol for Block Propagation Using Set Reconciliation}},
    Year = {2017}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @techreport{Ozisik:2017b,
    Address = {Amherst, MA},
    Arxiv_Techrep_Url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00082},
    Author = { A. Pinar Ozisik and George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine},
    Demo_Url = {http://www.cs.umass.edu/~brian/blockchain.html},
    Institution = {University of Massachusetts},
    Keywords = {blockchain; security},
    Month = {July},
    Number = {arXiv:1707.00082},
    Title = {{Estimation of Miner Hash Rates and Consensus on Blockchains}},
    Year = {2017}}

    [link]

  • @techreport{Bissias:2016,
    Address = {Amherst, MA},
    Arxiv_Techrep_Url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07985},
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and A. Pinar Ozisik and Gavin Andresen},
    Institution = {University of Massachusetts},
    Keywords = {blockchain; security},
    Month = {October},
    Number = {arXiv:1610.07985},
    Title = {{An Analysis of Attacks on Blockchain Consensus}},
    Year = {2016}}

    [link]

  • @techreport{Ozisik:2016,
    Address = {Amherst, MA},
    Author = { A. Pinar Ozisik and Gavin Andresen and George Bissias and Amir Houmansadr and Brian Neil Levine},
    Institution = {University of Massachusetts},
    Keywords = {blockchain; security; peer-to-peer},
    Month = {October},
    Number = {UM-CS-2016-006},
    Title = {{A Secure, Efficient, and Transparent Network Architecture for Bitcoin}},
    Url = {https://web.cs.umass.edu/publication/details.php?id=2417},
    Year = {2016},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://web.cs.umass.edu/publication/details.php?id=2417}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @article{Bissias:2015a,
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and Marc Liberatore and Brian Lynn and Juston Moore and Hanna Wallach and Janis Wolak},
    Doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2015.10.022},
    Journal = {Elsevier Child Abuse \& Neglect},
    Keywords = {forensics; peer-to-peer;Child sexual exploitation;Journal Paper},
    Month = {February},
    Pages = {185--199},
    Sponsors = {2011-MC-CX-0001},
    Title = {{Characterization of Contact Offenders and Child Exploitation Material Trafficking on Five Peer-to-Peer Networks}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.ChildAbuseNeglect.2015.pdf},
    Volume = {52},
    Year = {2016},
    Bdsk-Url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2015.10.022}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @article{Bissias:2015,
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and Marc Liberatore and Swagatika Prusty},
    Journal = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
    Keywords = {forensics; peer-to-peer; anonymity; Journal Paper},
    Month = {Accepted for publication in},
    Sponsors = {CNS-1018615},
    Title = {{Forensic Identification of Anonymous Sources in OneSwarm}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.tdsc.2015.pdf},
    Year = {2015},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/prusty.ccs.2011.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @inproceedings{Bissias:2014,
    Author = { George Bissias and A. Pinar Ozisik and Brian Neil Levine and Marc Liberatore},
    Booktitle = {Proc.\ ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society},
    Keywords = {Privacy; blockchain; Sybil attack; Peer-to-peer},
    Month = {November},
    Slides_Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/slides/ozisik.wpes.2014.slides.pdf},
    Title = {{Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.wpes.2014.pdf},
    Year = {2014},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.wpes.2014.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @inproceedings{Bissias:2010,
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and Ramesh Sitaraman},
    Booktitle = {Proc.\ ACM Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT)},
    Keywords = {security; wireless; routing},
    Month = {November},
    Slides_Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.conext.2010.slides.pdf},
    Sponsor = {CNS-0519881 and CNS-0519894},
    Title = {{Assessing the Vulnerability of Replicated Network Services}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.conext.2010.pdf},
    Year = {2010},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.conext.2010.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @inproceedings{Burgess:2007,
    Abstract = {Disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) deliver data in network environments composed of intermittently connected nodes. Just as in traditional networks, malicious nodes within a DTN may attempt to delay or destroy data in transit to its destination. Such attacks include dropping data, flooding the network with extra messages, corrupting routing tables, and counterfeiting network acknowledgments. Many existing methods for securing routing protocols require authentication supported by mechanisms such as a public key infrastructure, which is difficult to deploy and operate in a DTN, where connectivity is sporadic. Furthermore, the complexity of such mechanisms may dissuade node participation so strongly that potential attacker impacts are dwarfed by the loss of contributing participants. In this paper, we use connectivity traces from our UMass DieselNet project and the Haggle project to quantify routing attack effectiveness on a DTN that lacks security. We introduce plausible attackers and attack modalities and provide complexity results for the strongest of attackers. We show that the same routing with packet replication used to provide robustness in the face of unpredictable mobility allows the network to gracefully survive attacks. In the case of the most effective attack, acknowledgment counterfeiting, we show a straightforward defense that uses cryptographic hashes but not a central authority. We conclude that disruption-tolerant networks are extremely robust to attack; in our trace-driven evaluations, an attacker that has compromised 30% of all nodes reduces delivery rates from 70% to 55%, and to 20% with knowledge of future events. By comparison, contemporaneously connected networks are significantly more fragile. },
    Address = {Montreal, Quebec, Canada},
    Author = {Burgess, John and Bissias, George and Corner, Mark D. and Levine, Brian Neil},
    Booktitle = {Proc. ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)},
    Keywords = {DTN; wireless; security; routing; DOME},
    Month = {September},
    Pages = {61--70},
    Slides_Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/mcorner/mobihoc07.ppt},
    Sponsors = {CNS-0133055, CNS-0519881, and CNS 0447877},
    Title = {{Surviving Attacks on Disruption-Tolerant Networks without Authentication}},
    Traces_Url = {http://traces.cs.umass.edu},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/burgess.mobihoc.2007.pdf},
    Year = {2007},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/burgess.mobihoc.2007.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @inproceedings{Bissias:2007,
    Author = { George Bissias and Brian Neil Levine and Arnold L. Rosenberg},
    Booktitle = {Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS},
    Keywords = {security; routing},
    Month = {{June}},
    Pages = {367---368},
    Poster_Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.sigmetrics.abstract.2007.pdf},
    Sponsors = {CNS-0133055, ANI-0325868},
    Title = {{Bounding Damage From Link Destruction with Application to the Internet (extended abstract)}},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.sigmetrics.abstract.2007.pdf},
    Year = {2007},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.sigmetrics.abstract.2007.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

  • @inproceedings{Bissias:2005,
    Abstract = {Encrypting traffic does not prevent an attacker from performing some types of traffic analysis. We present a straightforward traffic analysis attack against encrypted HTTP streams that is surprisingly effective in identifying the source of the traffic. An attacker starts by creating a profile of the statistical characteristics of web requests from interesting sites, including distributions of packet sizes and inter-arrival times. Later, candidate encrypted streams are compared against these profiles. In our evaluations using real traffic, we find that many web sites are sub ject to this attack. With a training period of 24 hours and a 1 hour delay afterwards, the attack achieves only 23% accuracy. However, an attacker can easily pre-determine which of trained sites are easily identifiable. Accordingly, against 25 such sites, the attack achieves 40% accuracy; with three guesses, the attack achieves 100% accuracy for our data. Longer delays after training decrease accuracy, but not substantially. We also propose some countermeasures and improvements to our current method. Previous work analyzed SSL traffic to a proxy, taking advantage of a known flaw in SSL that reveals the length of each web object. In contrast, we exploit the statistical characteristics of web streams that are encrypted as a single flow, which is the case with WEP/WPA, IPsec, and SSH tunnels.},
    Author = {Bissias, George and Liberatore, Marc and Jensen, David and Levine, Brian Neil},
    Booktitle = {Proc. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET)},
    Keywords = {security; anonymity; privacy},
    Month = {May},
    Pages = {1--11},
    Sponsors = {NSF-0133055 and NSF-0325868 and NSF-0080199},
    Title = {{Privacy Vulnerabilities in Encrypted HTTP Streams}},
    Traces_Url = {http://traces.cs.umass.edu},
    Url = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.liberatore.pet.2005.pdf},
    Year = {2005},
    Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://forensics.umass.edu/pubs/bissias.liberatore.pet.2005.pdf}}

    [link][PDF]

 
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