Halting and Unsolvability

- Proving Something to be Impossible
- Representing TM’s By Strings
- The Universal Turing Machine
- The Barber of Seville Language
- Undecidable and Non-Recognizable Languages
- Getting More Undecidable Languages
- Turing Complete Languages
Proving Things to Be Impossible

• When a problem can be solved with a particular set of resources, we can prove this to be the case by showing how to do it.

• But what about when a problem can’t be solved with those resources? We can’t just show algorithms that don’t work, because these don’t rule out the existence of other algorithms that do.
Proving Things to Be Impossible

• We have one example in this course -- if a language cannot be decided by a DFA, the Myhill-Nerode Theorem can be used to prove it. This also shows that the language has no regular expression.

• Gödel proved in 1931 that there is a true statement of number theory that can’t be proved (or a false statement that can be proved). The idea is that the statement can be interpreted as “I am not provable”.
Clicker Question #1

• Suppose that Statement n means “there is no proof of Statement n in the system”. Which one of these statement could be true?

• (a) Statement n is false and cannot be proved.
• (b) Statement n is true and can be proved.
• (c) Statement n is true but cannot be proved.
• (d) The system proves all true statements, and no false statements.
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Proving Limits on TM’s

- By the Church-Turing Thesis, if we prove that no Turing machine can decide a particular language, that means that no algorithm can decide it.
- Deciding a language means solving a general class of problems, not just a single instance.
- The basic idea is called diagonalization, for reasons we won’t be able to go into here.
Proving Limits on TM’s

• Like the Gödel argument, we get a contradiction out of applying a hypothetical Turing machine to itself. The assumption that our target problem is decidable leads to this contradiction, so it is false and the problem is not decidable.

• To formulate this argument, we will have to say more about Turing machines that take other Turing machines as input.
The Universal Turing Machine

- We could, with some effort, formalize a scheme for representing Turing machines by strings. We would need the string to code the number of states, the number of letters in the input alphabet and in the tape alphabet, the special states, and the transition function.

- It doesn’t really matter how this information is stored, as long as it’s possible for an algorithm (and therefore a Turing machine) to answer questions about the states and transition function.
The Universal Turing Machine

- Once this is done, it is possible to build a universal Turing machine.
- This machine takes two inputs, a Turing machine M and a string w over M's input alphabet.
- It simulates the action of M on w, accepting or rejecting if and only if M would accept or reject w.
- Now we have a Turing machine that acts on Turing machines.
The Barber of Seville

- The Barber of Seville shaves exactly those men of Seville who do not shave themselves.
- Bertrand Russell proposed this statement as a logical paradox.
- If the barber is a man of Seville who does not shave himself, the rule obligates him to shave himself.
- And if he is a man of Seville who does shave himself, the rule forbids him to shave himself.
The Barber of Seville Language

• The only solution is that he is not from Seville, or that she is not a man.

• Define the **Barber of Seville language** to be the set of TM’s that do not accept themselves. Formally, $L_{BS}$ is the set \{M: M \not\in L(M)\} or \{M: (M, M) \not\in L(U)\} where U is the universal TM.

• A **Barber of Seville Turing machine** would be a TM $M_{BS}$ such that $L(M_{BS}) = L_{BS}$, a TM that accepts exactly those TM’s that don’t accept themselves.
Non-TD and Non-TR Languages

• Just as the Barber can’t be a man of Seville, the machine $M_{BS}$ cannot exist. If it did, $M_{BS}$ either would accept $M_{BS}$ or it wouldn’t. If it does, by definition it doesn’t, and if it doesn’t, by definition it does.

• This tells us that the language $L_{BS}$ is not Turing recognizable because it is not the language of any Turing machine. Since all decidable languages are also recognizable, $L_{BS}$ is not decidable either.
Clicker Question #2

- What about the set of Turing machines that do recognize themselves, \(\{M: (M, M) \in L(U)\}\)? Is this set Turing recognizable?
- (a) Yes, because you can run \(U\) on \((M, M)\) and see whether it ever halts.
- (b) Yes, because otherwise it would be Turing decidable and it isn’t.
- (c) No, because its complement is not TR.
- (d) No, it is Turing decidable instead.
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Non-TD and Non-TR Languages

• But note that the language $L_{BS}$-bar is recognizable. It is the union of the set of strings that don’t code Turing machines at all, and the set of TM’s that do accept themselves.

• We can recognize the latter set by taking any machine $M$ and feeding the pair $(M, M)$ to the universal TM. The former set is decidable, assuming that we have defined our coding scheme unambiguously.

• So we have an example of a language that is recognizable but not decidable.
Getting More Non-TD Languages

- Of course it would be much more interesting to have an undecidable language that we actually might have wanted to decide.

- We can do this by the **method of reduction**. Given a language $X$, we prove that we could decide $L_{BS}$ if we had a decider for $X$. Then since the decider for $L_{BS}$ cannot exist, the decider for $X$ cannot exist either.
More Non-TD Languages

• For example, let $L_{\text{halt}}$ be the set of all pairs $(M, w)$ such that $M$ is a TM that eventually halts on the input string $w$. Suppose I had a decider for $L_{\text{halt}}$.

• Given any Turing machine $M$, I can now decide whether $M$ is in $L_{\text{BS}}$ by forming the pair $(M, M)$ and feeding it to the $L_{\text{halt}}$ decider. If the decider says that $M$ will not halt on $M$, then $M$ is in $L_{\text{BS}}$. If it will halt, I can then run $M$ on $M$ and see whether it accepts, knowing that this computation will not run forever.
Clicker Question #3

- Let $EL = \{M: L(M) = \emptyset\}$ be the set of TM’s that do not accept any strings. How would I use the method of reduction to prove that $EL$ is not TD?

- (a) Show that $L_{BS}$ is a subset of $EL$.

- (b) Show that given any $M$, I can make a Turing machine $f(M)$ so that $M \in EL \iff f(M) \in L_{BS}$.

- (c) Show that given any $M$, I can make a Turing machine $f(M)$ so that $M \in L_{BS} \iff f(M) \in EL$.

- (d) Show that $L_{BS}$ and $EL$ are the same language.
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More Non-TD Languages

- As we build up a library of undecidable languages, we can use any of them in place of $L_{BS}$ in this kind of argument.

- For example, **Conway’s Game of Life** is a set of rules that lets patterns of pixels “evolve” over time. It’s *undecidable* whether a pattern will stay bounded, or ever include a given pixel.
More Non-TD Languages

• The proof of this is remarkable -- someone designed a way to emulate an arbitrary Turing machine with a pixel pattern.

• So a decider for the Game of Life questions could be used to answer undecidable questions about TM's.
Turing Completeness

• In CMPSCI 311 and 501, you will spend a lot of time with the concept of complete languages for a class.

• $L_{\text{halt}}$ turns out to be Turing complete, or complete for the set of recognizable languages. We can take any recognizable language $X$, and any string $w$, and transform $w$ into a string $f(w)$ such that $w$ is in $X$ if and only if $f(w)$ is in $L_{\text{halt}}$. 
Turing Completeness

- This means that the language $L_{\text{halt}}$ captures every possible Turing recognizable computation.

- If we could decide $L_{\text{halt}}$, then, we could decide every TR language. But we know that TR languages exists that are not TD. So $L_{\text{halt}}$ is not TD.

- In the same way, we see that no Turing-complete language is TD.
NP-Completeness

- The class **NP** or nondeterministic polynomial time is the set of languages that are recognized by nondeterministic Turing machines in polynomial time.

- If we prove a language to be **NP-complete** by showing that any NP language can be reduced to it, we are pretty sure that it is not actually decidable in polynomial time by a deterministic TM.

- This is because if it were the classes P and NP would be the same, and we are pretty sure that they are not.