A Meta-Analysis of State-of-the-Art Electoral Prediction From Twitter Data

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Abstract
Electoral prediction from Twitter data is an appealing research topic. It seems relatively straightforward and the prevailing view is overly optimistic. This is problematic because while simple approaches are assumed to be good enough, core problems are not addressed. Thus, this article aims to (1) provide a balanced and critical review of the state of the art; (2) cast light on the presume predictive power of Twitter data; and (3) propose some considerations to push forward the field. Hence, a scheme to characterize Twitter prediction methods is proposed. It covers every aspect from data collection to performance evaluation, through data processing and vote inference. Using that scheme, prior research is analyzed and organized to explain the main approaches taken up to date but also their weaknesses. This is the first meta-analysis of the whole body of research regarding electoral prediction from Twitter data. It reveals that its presumed predictive power regarding electoral prediction has been somewhat exaggerated: Social media may provide a glimpse on electoral outcomes but, up to now, research has not provided strong evidence to support it can currently replace traditional polls. Nevertheless, there are some reasons for optimism and, hence, further work on this topic is required, along with tighter integration with traditional electoral forecasting research.

Keywords
Twitter, social media, prediction, forecasting, politics, elections

Introduction
Real-world events have an impact on online systems and trails left by users on such systems have been used to perform early event detection in an automatic fashion. Indeed, a number of well-known studies have shown that flu (Ginsberg et al., 2009), unemployment rates (Choi & Varian, 2009a), or car sales (Choi & Varian, 2009b) can be forecasted on the basis of web-search queries.

Previsouly, but in a similar way, blog posts were correlated with book sales (Gruhl, Guha, Kumar, Novak, & Tomkins, 2005) or movie gross incomes (Mishne & Glance, 2006). It must be noted that while queries are not amenable to sentiment analysis, blog posts are and, hence, by applying opinion...
mining to blogs, stronger correlations can be found (e.g., Mishne & de Rijke, 2006; Mishne & Glance 2006).

When compared to blogs, microblogging is a recent phenomenon; still, there is a growing number of studies aiming to “take the pulse” of society using such data. The brevity of microposts; the fact that a single service, Twitter, is the de facto standard for such kind of publishing; and the ease of collecting data with public APIs (Application Programming Interface); coupled with the promising results obtained in the past by mining query logs and blogs are probably the main reasons driving the interest of researchers on Twitter data to predict both present and future events.

For instance, Asur and Huberman (2010) exploited Twitter data to predict box office revenues for movies; O’Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith (2010) rather successfully correlated tweets with several public opinion time series; Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe (2010) claimed to have predicted the outcome of German elections; Bollen, Mao, and Zeng (2011) the stock market; and Lampos and Cristianini (2010) the evolution of flu pandemics.

A shallow reading of that growing body of literature could suggest that Twitter data offer remarkable and versatile predictive power; however, this has been already questioned a few times. For instance, Ming Fai Wong, Sen, and Chiang (2012) raised some doubts on the predictability of box office performance from Twitter data; and, in a similar way, Jungherr, Jürgens, and Schoen (2011) rebutted the main thesis by Tumasjan et al. (2010) namely, that tweet volume and votes are strongly correlated.

Those skeptical studies, although a minority, cast reasonable doubts on the feasibility of using Twitter data for predictive purposes or, at least, on the feasibility of applying naive methods to that end. To start with, it must be acknowledged a strong bias permeating research: The tendency of researchers to report positive results while not reporting negative ones. This bias, the so-called file drawer effect (Fanelli, 2010), can be harmful if not accounted for. First, if caution is not exerted, it can be assumed that published (and positive) results are the norm and they are to be expected in the future within similar scenarios to those described in the literature. Second, it makes difficult to publish negative or contradictory results since the burden of proof tends to lie on those criticizing the prevailing (positive) point of view.

Moreover, most of the aforementioned predictions—namely, those involving box office results, the stock market, epidemics, or opinion polls—are not predicting events but exhibiting correlation between two time series: one obtained from Twitter data and another one observed in the “offline” world. In that regard, such methods are models and, therefore, they are not proven or disproven; instead, they can be more or less accurate and, hence, more or less useful.

Elections, however, are discrete events; it is true there exists a political continuum where candidates and voters are located but, eventually, voters choose a candidate and cast their vote. The possibility of using Twitter data to predict electoral outcomes has been the subject of a rather substantial amount of research. The aim of this work is to provide a high-level picture of that research and some recommendations to push it forward.

As with other predictive areas, there are opposing points of view regarding the predictive power of Twitter data on elections. Most of the debate has centered on methodological issues regarding data collection, vote prediction, and performance evaluation. Hence, some studies claim that simple methods achieve remarkable performance due to the massive amount of data available in Twitter. This author, in contrast, argues that (1) baselines chosen to evaluate performance up to now are not realistic; (2) simple methods achieve inconsistent results when replicated; and (3) their presumed tolerance to noise should not be taken for granted but much better substantiated. Therefore, in this work prior reports are analyzed to:

- Reach conclusions on the presumed power of state-of-the-art methods for Twitter-based electoral prediction;
- Point out the main methodological weaknesses in such approaches;
Suggest important challenges that still require further work;  
Provide some recommendations for those interested in pushing forward this area.

All of this requires a thorough review of the literature. Nevertheless, more important than providing a bibliography it is to organize those different reports within a coherent conceptual scheme. That scheme is described in a later section. The following one provides a broad picture of current research on the analysis of Twitter from a political science perspective; that will offer a context for the main topic of this work.

Application of Twitter Data to Political Science

As aforementioned, Twitter has attracted plenty of attention from researchers mainly because of its real-time nature and the easiness of data collection; those researchers are exploiting Twitter data to better understand society. However, it is out of the reach of this work surveying such broad line of research; in that regard, the report by O’Connor, Bamman, and Smith (2011) provides a brief, but highly illustrative, perspective on the current spectrum of social science research exploiting Twitter data.

This work only focuses on the body of research dealing with electoral prediction from Twitter data. Nevertheless, not every research on the application of Twitter to political science is related to elections; and, in fact, most of the time, politically charged tweets are not related with elections. Hence, this section provides some background on the application of Twitter data to political science. The list of cited works is representative but necessarily incomplete.

Needless to say, Twitter has been analyzed from many different points of view within political science; however, the main lines of research relevant for a reader interested in electoral prediction would be the following: public opinion; political leaning and polarization; and impact of Twitter in political discourse and debate. Studies on electoral prediction from Twitter data and those dealing with bias or noise in Twitter data are not covered here but in the Appendix.

One of the first studies on the feasibility of exploiting tweets to understand public opinion is the work by O’Connor et al. (2010). That paper is later mentioned since, in addition to public opinion, its authors tried to find a correlation between Twitter data and preelectoral polls. With regard to public opinion, they studied the relation between Twitter data and both consumer confidence and presidential approval in the United States. They applied a simple method of sentiment analysis to obtain a Twitter sentiment index for external indices, finding that in both cases there were a positive significant correlation with the actual time series. Similar but more recent approaches to obtain a proxy to public opinion from Twitter can be found in the works by Mejova, Srinivasan, and Boynton (2013), Mitchell and Hitlin (2013), and Ceron, Curini, Iacus, and Porro (2013).

Mejova et al. (2013) analyzed the perception of candidates taking part in the Republican Party presidential primaries in 2012. They applied state-of-the-art supervised machine learning methods to determine the sentiment of tweets finding that (1) such a method achieved low performance, (2) the prevailing sentiment in Twitter is mostly negative, (3) there is a huge amount of humor and sarcasm specially in negative tweets, and (4) there was little correlation between the evolution of sentiment in Twitter and the actual polls. To explain such results, they hypothesized that Twitter users lean toward more liberal political options, or maybe they are younger and, hence, more liberal.

Mitchell and Hitlin (2013), from Pew Research, published a report in which Twitter sentiment regarding different politically charged topics was compared against results from traditional polls and surveys conducted at the same time. Their conclusions were rather shocking: Twitter reaction does not usually agree with that of the general population and, in addition to that, the reaction is not consistent at all. That is, while sometimes Twitter reaction is more liberal than that of the population, in other occasions the reaction is more conservative. They disregarded any issue with the proprietary
sentiment analysis method they had used and, hence, they attributed those inconsistencies to the fact that there were different communities of users reacting to different topics. In other words, data collected from Twitter exhibit self-selection bias.

Finally, Ceron et al. (2013), in addition to trying to predict two different elections in France (more details on this in a later section), exploited Twitter data to rate the popularity of several Italian leaders along 2011. They achieved mixed results: First, opinion in Twitter is more negative than that obtained from polls; and second, while for some leaders the correlation between Twitter sentiment and polls was positive (albeit not strong), for other leaders there was no noticeable correlation at all.

So, in short, Twitter has been exploited to infer public opinion with mixed results; methods to automatically infer the sentiment of users are still a problem and, on top of that, the demographic and self-selection biases in Twitter data are significant issues too. Needless to say, any improvement in the analysis of public opinion from Twitter data could help to push forward electoral prediction using the same data source.

Another problem approached by different researchers is that of inferring the political leaning of Twitter users (not only individuals but also media outlets accounts). To the best of this author’s knowledge, Golbeck and Hansen (2011) and Conover, Gonçalves, Ratkiewicz, Flammini, and Menczer (2011) were the first to work on such task. Recent works in the area have been conducted by Barberá (2012), Boutet, Kim, and Yoneki (2012), and Wong, Tan, Sen, and Chiang (2013).

Golbeck and Hansen implemented a simple method that relied on the scores issued by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). ADA is a think tank that publishes scores for each member of the U.S. Congress on the basis of their voting record. Those scores range from 0, the most conservative, to 100, the most liberal. Given that many members of the Congress have got an official Twitter account, other Twitter users were scored by averaging the ADA scores of those representatives they were following in Twitter. Hence, this method does not rely on the published tweets but in the relationships between individuals and their representatives. An obvious problem is that external information about the political leaning of the representatives is required.

Conover et al. analyzed both content- and graph-based methods to infer the political leaning of Twitter users. They found that supervised methods trained over labeled tweets exhibited pretty high accuracy, but those results were outperformed when community detection methods were applied to the retweet graph.

Barberá (2012) also relied on the user graph to solve the same problem. Assuming that relationships among users are mostly homophilic, he studied whether the structure of the social network of users in Twitter can be used as a source of information about their political leaning. Hence, this method is not based on content but in the relationships among users and accounts of political actors in Twitter. After applying his method to Twitter data belonging to Spanish users, Barberá found that parties’ official accounts were correctly classified and that political leaning inferred for individual users also exhibited high accuracy.

Boutet, Kim, and Yoneki (2012) inferred users’ political leaning on the basis of the degree of tweets and retweets each user publishes regarding a given party account (in this case, in the United Kingdom). According to them, some of the methods achieved 86% accuracy without any training. The approach by Wong et al. (2013) was rather similar but, instead of relying just on tweets mentioning political parties, they exploited tweets focusing on many different events for which a sentiment score, and a political leaning depending on that score, were assigned. Hence, depending on the sentiment users expressed for those events they were assigned a given political leaning.

To sum up, works regarding political leaning of Twitter users generally report high accuracy. Hence, they should help understand the degree of support a given party (or ideology) has got on Twitter but also the possible ideological bias in Twitter when compared against the whole population. It must be noted, however, that the fact that a given user exhibits a given political leaning does not imply a vote in a given election.
Closely related to those works are several studies on the polarization of Twitter users according to their political preferences; those by Conover, Ratkiewicz, et al. (2011) or Feller, Kuhnert, Sprenger, and Welpe (2011) are a representative sample. According to these reports, users tend to follow and retweet like-minded people although they tend to debate with a much more diverse set of individuals. Such features, in addition to political leaning prediction, could help improve electoral prediction methods based on Twitter data.

Needless to say, there are aspects of politics and Twitter not covered by this shallow survey; for instance, its usage by political actors; its impact during electoral campaigns; or its role in the public sphere, especially for grassroots initiatives such as those seen during the Arab Spring, the Indignants protests, or the Occupy movement. These and other perspectives are important but not highly related to electoral forecasting; thus, they are not explored in this work.

Characterization of Twitter-Based Electoral Prediction Methods

As aforementioned, Twitter data have been mined to determine the public opinion on several topics and preelectoral and electoral polls have been studied as part of that public opinion. The number of reports in this issue has grown considerably and most of them claim from promising to positive results. However, most of the evidence provided by such reports is rather weak and, therefore, this work aims to analyze and contrast such evidence to, first, point out the weaknesses in current research and, second, to suggest further lines of work.

Although unstated in most of the studies, it is commonly implied that any method to predict electoral results from Twitter data is an algorithm. Such algorithms are devised as a pipeline that starts with the collection of data from Twitter, goes on processing that data, and finishes with a prediction that needs to be evaluated against the actual results of the elections. Needless to say, the algorithms can be parameterized to adapt to different scenarios, and predictions can be more or less detailed (for instance, the algorithms can just provide the winner or vote rates for different candidates). Thus, there are a number of features defining any method to predict electoral results from Twitter; namely:

1. Period and method of collection: that is, the dates when tweets were collected and the parameterization used to collect them.
2. Data cleansing measures:
   a. Purity: that is, to guarantee that only tweets from prospective voters are used to make the prediction.
   b. Debiasing: that is, to guarantee that any demographic bias in the Twitter user base is removed.
   c. Denoising: that is, to remove tweets not dealing with voter opinions (e.g., spam or disinformation) or even users not corresponding to actual prospective voters (e.g., spammers, robots, or propagandists).
   d. Prediction method and its nature:
      a. The method to infer voting intentions from tweets.
      b. The nature of the inference: that is, whether the method predicts individual votes or aggregated vote rates.
      c. The nature of the prediction: that is, whether the method predicts just a winner or vote rates for each candidate.
      d. Granularity: that is, the level at which the prediction is made (e.g., district, state, or national).
3. Performance evaluation: that is, the way in which the prediction is compared with the actual outcome of the election.
It must be noted that not every feature in the previous scheme needs to appear in every method. For instance, up to now, all of the research on electoral prediction from Twitter data has worked on tweets related to the parties and candidates taking part in the elections; however, it could be conceivable to use tweets related to broader topics (e.g., health system, unemployment, or taxes), or even the whole Twitter stream for a given country or region to predict elections.

In a similar way, many researchers have not applied data cleansing measures arguing that, with enough data, Twitter-based methods should be noise tolerant. Such an approach does not imply, however, that data cleansing measures are to be removed from the conceptual scheme; indeed, not applying any of such measures could be an option regarding that feature. In addition to that, it must be noted that, up to now, none of the methods using raw tweets without removing spam, robots, or astroturfers has provided strong proof of being noise tolerant. Certainly, for each of such methods there has been one report claiming positive results but, as it will be shown, successive papers replicating those methods have not achieved comparable results. Of course, this does not imply that noise tolerant methods are unfeasible but, instead, that noise tolerance should be proven through carefully devised experiments.

So, in short, any method to predict elections from Twitter data should be studied according to four different aspects: (1) the data collection approach—which could be focused on candidates and parties or could be much broader; (2) the approach taken to deal with noise—that is, removing most of it or accepting its presence; (3) the method of prediction and the way in which that prediction is provided—for example, giving the winner of the race, the vote share, or the number of seats achieved; and (4) the way in which the method is evaluated.

Consequently, all of the papers analyzed in this work have been characterized according to such a scheme. Table 1 shows that characterization and it includes descriptive information for each of the elections. Following sections provide further details for each of the methods in the literature with regard to each of the features in the scheme.

**General Characteristics of Research Conducted Up to Date**

The first thing that Table 1 reveals is that literature regarding electoral prediction has not actually made any prediction, given that all of the reports were written post facto. Therefore, those studies claiming positive or promising results are, in fact, describing how certain elections could have been predicted.

Moreover, authors describing positive results do not usually replicate or improve their method in successive studies. Fortunately, as it will be shown, only two different approaches to voting inference in Twitter have been widely used—namely, tweet counting and lexicon-based sentiment analysis—and, thus, a number of papers have evaluated and compared both. That will help to draw some conclusions about their respective performance.

In addition to that, a number of papers deal with the same elections. O’Connor et al. (2010) and Gayo-Avello (2011) covered the U.S. presidential election in 2008. And Tumasjan et al. (2010) and Jungherr et al. (2011) covered the German federal election in 2009. By analyzing those papers, it should be possible to determine if consistent results can be obtained from Twitter data or if, conversely, results depend on decisions made by the researchers when choosing the method’s parameters.

The rest of papers correspond to single case scenarios; among such works, the research conducted by Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and Gayo-Avello (2011) deserves special attention since it covers six different races from the same elections in the United States. That paper hypothesizes that positive results achieved by the simplest methods used up to now could be due to mere chance.

Regarding the elections studied in the literature, the United States is the best covered scenario (four papers), followed by Germany (two papers); Ireland, Singapore, the Netherlands, and France are covered by one paper each.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period and Method of Collection</th>
<th>Data Cleansing</th>
<th>Prediction Method</th>
<th>Performance Evaluation</th>
<th>Reported Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith, 2010</td>
<td>U.S. presidential election, 2008; November 4, 2008</td>
<td>February to November 2008; candidate names used as key words</td>
<td>No cleansing at all</td>
<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis; aggregated results at national level; no prediction attempted</td>
<td>Correlation against preelectoral polls</td>
<td>No significant correlation found</td>
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<td>Gayo-Avello, 2011</td>
<td>U.S. presidential election, 2008; November 4, 2008</td>
<td>June 1 to November 3, 2008; presidential and vice presidential candidate names</td>
<td>Geolocated tweets at county level; attempt to debias data according to user age</td>
<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis; individual votes; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>MAE against actual electoral results</td>
<td>MAE 13.10% (uncompetitive with traditional polls)</td>
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<td>Tumasjan et al., 2010</td>
<td>German federal election, 2009 (September 27, 2009)</td>
<td>August 13 to September 19, 2009; parties present in the Bundestag and politicians from those parties</td>
<td>No cleansing at all</td>
<td>Number of tweets; aggregated results at national level; vote rates</td>
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<td>Unstable MAE depending on time window but larger than MAE reported by Tumasjan et al., 2010; incorrect prediction when taking into account all parties running for election</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jungherr, Jürgens, and Schoen, 2011</td>
<td>German federal election, 2009 (September 27, 2009)</td>
<td>Different time windows from August 13 to September 27, 2009; parties running for election</td>
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Table 1 (continued). Results by Metaxas et al. (2011) when trying to replicate results using methods analogous to those by O’Connor et al., 2010 and Tumasjan et al., 2010. As it can be seen, results are inconclusive and there is no clear relation between MAE and accuracy of prediction.

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<tr>
<td>Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and Gayo-Avello, 2011</td>
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<td>January 13–20, 2010; Candidate names</td>
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<td>Number of tweets. Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Winner prediction and MAE</td>
<td>Incorrect prediction; MAE 6.3%</td>
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<td>U.S. elections in CO, 2010 (November 2, 2010)</td>
<td>October 26 to November 1, 2010. Candidate names used to filter a gardenhose data set</td>
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<td>Number of tweets. Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis and vote share; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
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<td>U.S. elections in NV, 2010 (November 2, 2010)</td>
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<td>Number of tweets. Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis and vote share; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
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<th>No cleansing at all</th>
<th>Number of tweets.</th>
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<th>Correct prediction; MAE 3.8%</th>
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<td>Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis and vote share; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Incorrect prediction; MAE 6.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. elections in KY, 2010 (November 2, 2010)</td>
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<td>Correct prediction; MAE 39.6%</td>
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<td>Number of tweets.</td>
<td>Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Correct prediction; 1.2%</td>
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<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis and vote share; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
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<td>Incorrect prediction; MAE 26.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. elections in DE, 2010 (November 2, 2010)</td>
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<td>Number of tweets.</td>
<td>Aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
<td>Incorrect prediction; MAE 19.8%</td>
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<td>Lexicon-based sentiment analysis and vote share; aggregated results at state level; vote rates</td>
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Table 1 (continued). Studies by Livne et al., 2011; Bermingham and Smeaton, 2011; and Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, and Jiang, 2012. The former is not properly a prediction method.

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<tr>
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<th>Election Type</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
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<td>Livne et al., 2011</td>
<td>U.S. elections, 2010 (November 2, 2010)</td>
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<td>Tweets and social graph for 700 candidates; Not applicable; this method did not employ potential voter tweets but candidate data</td>
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<td>Winner prediction; 81.5% accuracy when using external data alone; 83.8% accuracy when incorporating tweets (but not graph data); not noticeable improvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bermingham and Smeaton, 2011</td>
<td>Irish general election, 2011 (February 25, 2011)</td>
<td>February 8–25, 2011; major parties</td>
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<td>MAE against actual electoral results; MAE 3.67%; (uncompetitive with traditional polls)</td>
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<td>Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, and Jiang, 2012</td>
<td>Singaporean general election, 2011 (May 7, 2011)</td>
<td>April 1 to May 7, 2011; Tweets by 13,000 Singaporean political engaged users; parties and candidates names were used to filter the tweets</td>
<td>Only data produced by users located at Singapore was used</td>
<td>Number of tweets; aggregated results at national level; vote rates</td>
<td>MAE 5.23%; inconclusive since preelectoral polls are banned in Singapore</td>
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<td><strong>Table 1 (continued).</strong> Studies by Tjong Kim Sang &amp; Bos (2012) and Ceron et al. (2013).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012</strong></td>
<td>Dutch senate election, 2011 (May 23, 2011)</td>
<td>February 23 to March 1, 2011; major parties</td>
<td>No cleansing at all</td>
<td>Number of tweets; aggregated results at national level; number of Senate seats</td>
<td>Offset in number of seats as compared with actual results</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Attempt to debias data according to political leaning using preelectoral polling data</td>
<td>Sentiment analysis; aggregated results at national level; number of Senate seats</td>
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<td><strong>Ceron, Curini, Iacus, and Porro, 2013</strong></td>
<td>French presidential election, 2nd round, 2012 (May 6, 2012)</td>
<td>April 27 to May 5, 2012; candidates for the second round</td>
<td>No cleansing at all</td>
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<td>One week before the election; candidates and parties taking part into the elections</td>
<td>No cleansing at all</td>
<td>Sentiment analysis; aggregated results at national level; vote rates</td>
<td>MAE against actual electoral results</td>
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</table>

**Note.** MAE = mean absolute error.

Reports are ordered according to date of election and not of publication. Results appear on the right; those positive are shaded. In the study by Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012) MAE (computed by this author) is rather competitive with traditional polls. Interestingly, the more complex method incorporating sentiment analysis and some pre-election poll data underperforms the simpler relying on tweet counts. The work by Ceron et al. (2013) regarding the French presidential and legislative elections achieved results comparable to those of traditional polls although with a larger of error.
**Method of Collection**

Twitter offers two methods for data collection: the Twitter Search API and the Twitter Streaming API. The first one is far less common nowadays, although it was the only choice before the Streaming API was available. There are two main disadvantages when using the Search API: First, results are retrieved using a sliding window which means that it is not possible to retrieve data from any arbitrary date but just a few days before the current one. The second issue is that the Search API has been devised to power Twitter’s search engine and, thus, it has a bias toward those users considered by the algorithm as more relevant.

Because of those problems and other technical issues, the Streaming API is the usual choice of researchers. It must be noted that the whole stream of tweets (the so-called Firehose) is not publicly available and that the tweets appearing in the public (and free) API are just a sample of the whole stream. According to Twitter, the sample is statistically representative, but this has been questioned (Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 2013). Finally, it must be noted that the Streaming API provides content in real time and not historical data.

No matter the API of choice, there are some parameters that need to be set before collecting any data such as key words or geographical coordinates. The latter are optional and they allow the API user to delimit a geographical area from which tweets would be obtained, this would be obviously an advantage in order to predict electoral results but, as it will be later discussed, it is seldom used. Key words, however, are not optional and, in fact, they are crucial to determine the precision and recall of the collected data set. Most of electoral predictions using Twitter data have employed names of candidates and parties as key words. It must be noted that, in general, researchers provide very scarce information about the key words chosen to compile their data sets. In addition to that, very little attention is paid to the precision of the collected data or to alternative ways to improve recall.

**Period of Collection**

Table 1 reveals important differences among studies with regard to some of the features in the scheme. For instance, the period of data collection varies widely. Table 2 shows that some studies collected data just 1 week before the elections, while others collected data for weeks, months, or even years before the event.

There is consensus, however, about the ending point for the period of collection: the day before elections. The only paper not following this convention is that by Tumasjan et al. (2010) and, as it will be shown, this was a matter of later criticism by other researchers (Jungherr, Jürgens, & Schoen, 2011).

It must be noted that it is unclear the impact of the period of collection in the predictions: Jungherr et al. (2011) showed that using different time windows, performance underwent significant variations. At the same time, Metaxas et al. (2011), using just 1 week of data, obtained both correct and incorrect predictions. Yet, none of those researchers draw any conclusion regarding the nature of the impact exerted by the size of the time window chosen for the data collection. Hence, further research in this matter is needed to find compelling criteria to choose an appropriate period of collection. In the absence of such criteria, researchers should refer to literature in traditional electoral forecasting (cf. Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1992 and Campbell & Garand, 2000).

**Data Cleansing**

Data cleansing refers to measures adopted to filter out or weight tweets in order to improve the accuracy of the prediction. Needless to say, depending on the properties of such filtering there would be a continuum of methods. At one extreme, there would be those methods applying no filtering or...
weighting; such methods usually claim to be tolerant to both noise due to spam, astroturfing, or misleading propaganda, and to bias in the Twitter user base. As it was aforementioned, besides the published positive (or promising) results in single cases, there is little proof in the literature supporting the idea that such methods are indeed noise and bias tolerant; especially, given that attempts to replicate such methods have usually achieved poorer results than those claimed in the original papers. However, this does not imply that noise and bias tolerant methods should not be studied in the future.

At the other extreme, there would be those methods trying to replicate as close as possible traditional polling methods. Such methods would adopt measures to ensure (1) data purity, that is, the collected data only comprises those users who are prospective voters, (2) noise removal, that is, the collected data only comprises those tweets dealing with the electoral process; and (3) bias correction; that is, any demographic bias in the Twitter user base is weighted accordingly to the voting population.

The first measure involves those decisions adopted to select Twitter users that are likely voters in the election of interest. It must be noted that such information is unavailable. Hence, researchers can, at best, limit the data collection to those users located in the area of interest for a given election. Such a method does not take into account those users not providing a valid location or emigrants eligible to vote; however, it certainly filters out those users expressing their views on the campaign without being eligible to vote. This approach to data purity can be implemented by collecting just geolocated tweets or by checking the location string of the users appearing in the collection.

It must be noted that, despite its simplicity, only two studies in the literature have applied such a measure: Gayo-Avello (2011) by relying on tweets geolocated in counties of interest, and Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, and Jiang (2012) by limiting the data set to those users located in Singapore. It is possible that the fact that many Twitter users do not geolocate their tweets or provide a valid location (Hecht, Hong, Suh, & Chi, 2011) have led researchers to not apply this method, so they can obtain larger collections.

Needless to say, there are certain scenarios in which geolocation can be obtained by indirect means: such as those cases in which voters speak a nonglobal language. For instance, (Jungherr...
et al., 2011; Tjong Kim Sang & Bos, 2012; Tumasjan, Spreenge, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010) ensured to a certain extent the purity of their collections on the basis of language use. The first two papers deal with German elections and, thus, it is very likely that tweets about German parties and politicians written in German are produced by German users and not Austrian or Swiss users. In the same way, the third study deals with Dutch elections and the data probably originated in the Netherlands and not Belgium. Unfortunately, when considering global languages (as English, for instance) or elections of worldwide interest (e.g., elections in the United States, France, or United Kingdom), such an approach is no longer valid and geolocation should be incorporated.

The second measure to clean the data is denoising. This includes any postprocessing of the data set to remove tweets or users not dealing with the electoral process. In other words, it implies the removal of spam, rumors, propaganda, disinformation, and users mainly producing noisy tweets. Table 1 reveals that no paper in the literature has adopted such measures although a few of them acknowledge the problem. For instance, Metaxas et al. (2011) made this warning:

Spammers and propagandists write programs that create lots of fake accounts and use them to tweet intensively, amplifying their message, and polluting the data for any observer. It’s known that this has happened in the past. It is reasonable that, if the image presented by social media is important to some (advertisers, spammers, propagandists), there will likely be people who will try to tamper with it.

In addition to that, these researchers conducted an experiment to check the robustness against such kind of manipulation of sentiment analysis methods most commonly used in this kind of studies. They found that:

[B]y just relying on polarity lexicons the subtleties of propaganda and disinformation are not only missed but even wrongly interpreted.

At this time, a key issue must be introduced: Most of the research regarding Twitter-based electoral predictions is not using state-of-the-art sentiment analysis. When applied, sentiment analysis methods are rather primitive and, hence, results are extremely sensible to noise. Needless to say, better methods of sentiment analysis should be applied in the future but, anyway, it should be checked if they are tolerant to the noise in political tweets or otherwise measures to remove such noise would be required.

The third and last data cleansing measure is debiasing. Twitter’s user base is not a representative sample of the population, and that problem can be tackled with by determining the demographic strata users belong to and weighting their tweets accordingly. The low representativeness of Twitter has been widely discussed. For instance, Boyd (2010) wrote the following:

Big Data presents new opportunities for understanding social practice. Of course the next statement must begin with a ‘but.’ And that ‘but’ is simple: [ . . . ] just because you have a big N doesn’t mean that it’s representative or generalizable.

Besides, even in the United States Twitter use is minor (11% of Americans) and their users are “overwhelmingly young” (Lenhart & Fox, 2009). This low representativeness is a major problem because dominating demographic groups may tilt toward a few selected political options (Smith & Rainie, 2008), and such a leaning heavily distorts results (Gayo-Avello, 2011).

Again, two approaches are possible: acknowledging the bias in the user base but arguing the method is bias tolerant, or assuming that bias-tolerant methods are not feasible and trying to weight each user and tweet according to the demographic composition of the voting population. As with claims about noise tolerance, there is little evidence in the literature that methods applied to Twitter
data were tolerant to bias. The main argument in favor of such tolerance is the achievement of positive results even when ignoring bias; however, as it has been said, such an argument is rather weak and is based on single-case results.

Unfortunately, results obtained when debiasing Twitter data according to the actual population are not really conclusive, mainly because, up to now, only two studies have attempted such an approach. The way in which such debiasing methods have been applied is as follows: First, demographic information about Twitter users is obtained; then, tweets from each demographic group are weighted according to prior knowledge about their electoral involvement. Needless to say, the first task is not simple; unlike other services, such as Facebook, Twitter profiles do not include structured information: There is no way to indicate the user’s sex or age and, instead, profiles consist of free text fields for name, location, website, and biography. Nonetheless, it is not an unsolvable problem since demographic information could be inferred indirectly (see, for instance, the work by Pennacchiotti & Popescu [2011] on user classification). Indeed, as it has been aforementioned, two papers have tried some kind of debiasing (see Table 1).

Gayo-Avello (2011) was able to obtain the age for about 2,500 users in his data set by crossing their full names and county of residence with online public records. This way he found that the data set was dominated by users in the 18–44 age interval. Then, by weighting their tweets according to age participation in the 2004 elections, he was able to reduce the error from 13.10% to 11.61%—a significant boost in performance.

Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012) tried a different approach: debiasing the data according to the presumed political leaning of the population. Certainly, such information is extremely relevant, especially if a “shy-Tory” effect is suspected. Unfortunately, their results were not conclusive since (1) the authors had to rely on pre-electoral polling data which could be seen as overfitting and (2) the performance of the method when debiasing was no better than a simpler method based on tweet counts.

Hence, on one hand, those methods ignoring bias in Twitter data have not actually proven they are bias tolerant and further research is needed in that line of work. On another hand, just two attempts to partially debias Twitter data have been conducted with inconclusive results. In the first case, correcting the data according to the age of the users improved the accuracy, while in the second case correcting the data according to the presumed political leaning of users did not improve the prediction.

So, in short, most of the methods attempting to predict elections based on Twitter data have not cleaned the collected tweets at all. Researchers working on raw unfiltered data acknowledge the presence of noise and biases in their data sets but claim that, given their positive or promising results, the simple methods they applied are noise and bias tolerant. In contrast, other researchers have shown that it is possible to limit the data collection to those regions of interest for a given election, that primitive sentiment analysis methods are very sensitive to noise, and that, although somewhat feasible and sensible from a theoretical point of view, removing bias from Twitter data has only partially demonstrated its usefulness.

Method of Prediction

Inferring Votes by Counting Tweets. Up to now, two main methods have been used to infer votes from tweets. The first one, originally proposed by Tumasjan et al. (2010), consists of merely counting the tweets mentioning a given candidate or party: the larger the number of tweets, the larger the vote rate. That method is appealing for many reasons: It is simple to implement, it can be applied in near real time, and it can be used both to obtain aggregated vote rates and to infer voting intentions for individuals (i.e., the candidate a user is mentioning the most would be his or her choice). Besides, Tumasjan et al. claimed the method exhibited very good performance:
The mere number of tweets reflects voter preferences and comes close to traditional election polls.

Indeed, Table 1 shows they reported an error of 1.65% for the German federal elections in 2009. Jungherr et al. (2011) later criticized some of the decisions taken by Tumasjan et al. (2010), especially those regarding the selection of parties and the period of data collection. As it has been discussed, the selected time window has an impact on predicted results; using the same time window employed by Tumasjan et al., Jungherr et al. found error values that were in the order of that reported by Tumasjan et al. However, when they used a time window ending at the election day (the most plausible decision and the most common in the literature), they found an error of 2.13% which is substantially larger than both the originally reported by Tumasjan et al. and that of traditional polls.

It has been already stated that further research is needed with regard to periods of data collection but, anyway, there are no reasons to suppose that tweet counting can be more sensitive to this issue than methods relying on sentiment analysis. Arguably, it is the selection of the candidates and parties to monitor the key parameter of methods based on tweet counts. The analysis of the Pirate Party case by Jungherr et al. (2011) showed that considering all the parties running for election even though they have not prior representatives achieves very different results. Unfortunately, there are no more studies in this regard: All of the papers applying tweet counting have monitored only major parties.

At this point, it would seem that there are no conclusive answers to the question of whether tweet counts are a good predictor of voting intention for major parties or not; after all, half of the papers using such simple method have correctly predicted the winner of the elections. However, that global performance alone is not highly impressive and, moreover, common arguments in favor of those methods are rather weak: The most frequent is summarized in the phrase “there is no such thing as bad publicity,” while the other is the usual argument about those methods being noise tolerant. Asserting that polarity in political opinions does not matter at all or that, in some way, positive and negative opinions about every party and candidate cancel each other, so that only raw counts matter are too simplistic reasons to be accepted at face value.

In this regard, an experiment conducted by Gayo-Avello (2011) is quite informative. He collected data from an informal opinion poll conducted during the U.S. presidential election in Twitter. A website called TwitVote asked users to declare their votes with a tweet tagged with the hashtag #twitvote. By collecting those tweets published in election day, he was able to find the actual votes for a number of users. With such data, he was able to compute the precision of both analyzers (i.e., the tweet counting method and the lexicon-based sentiment analyzer) when inferring votes from tweets published by those users whose eventual vote was known. In addition to that, both methods were compared against a perfectly informed random classifier: one assigning voting intention with regard to the proportion of “votes” according to TwitVote.

This way, he found not only that the lexicon-based method outperformed the tweet counting method but also that tweet counting underperformed the random classifier for both candidates: slightly for Obama and by a huge margin for McCain. The lexicon-based sentiment classifier, however, outperformed the random classifier with regard to both candidates.

Certainly, it could be argued that users in the data set by Gayo-Avello (2011) and those in TwitVote are different enough to justify the apparent underperformance of the tweet counting method when compared against the random classifier. In this regard, it must be noted that, according to Gayo-Avello, (1) when taking into account those users appearing in both data sets the performance of the tweet counting method is still below that of a lexicon-based approach and (2) the vote share in both data sets is not that different: 86.6% of users in both data sets “voted” for Obama compared to 85.9% of users in TwitVote who “voted” for him. Therefore, it seems rather plausible to consider vote sharing in TwitVote as a reasonable baseline against which to compare voting inferring methods for that election.
So, in short, tweet counting does not seem to outperform the simplest of sentiment analysis methods nor a random classifier. Moreover, only half of the races predicted by counting tweets achieved positive results, thus, making the hypothesis by Metaxas et al. (2011) that such results are due to mere chance rather plausible.

Inferring Votes With Sentiment Analysis. The other popular method to infer voting intentions from tweets is sentiment analysis. The name is misleading because despite the extensive research conducted in that field (cf. Pang & Lee, 2008 or Liu, 2012) most of the studies on electoral prediction have relied on the simplest methods.

Except for Bermingham and Smeaton (2011), Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012), and Ceron et al. (2013) who applied supervised sentiment analysis—with mixed results, it must be said—the rest of the studies have relied on lexicons to determine the polarity of tweets. O’Connor et al. (2010) were the first using that method. They relied on the lexicon by Wilson, Wiebe, and Hoffmann (2005), which consists of a list of terms labeled as positive or negative. Thus, tweets can be scored one way or the other, or even assigned both scores. Like the method based on tweet counts this one is also appealing because of its simplicity; but like the previous method it is also unsatisfactory. O’Connor et al. already found many examples of incorrectly detected sentiment although they argued that:

With a fairly large number of measurements, these errors will cancel out relative to the quantity we are interested in estimating, aggregate public opinion.

Using a noisy measurement instrument is not a problem per se, but it can be problematic if the classifier is producing different amounts of errors for each candidate. In this regard, the experiment on TwitVote described in previous subsection is again of interest. In that experiment, it was found that the performance of a lexicon-based classifier similar to that used by O’Connor et al. (2010) was very different depending on the candidate: Precision for Obama was rather high (88.8%) but very poor for McCain (17.7%). Hence, although the method outperforms a random classifier, it is highly unbalanced and, therefore, it is not very realistic to simply expect errors to cancel out when aggregating results.

Additional experiments with lexicon-based methods were conducted by Metaxas et al. (2011) confirming, first, that their performance is only slightly better than that of a random classifier; and second, that misleading information and propaganda are missed or wrongly interpreted as candidate support.

In short, polarity-based methods employed up to date:

- Miss the subtleties of political language.
- Exhibit very poor performance.
- Produce unbalanced results making unrealistic to accept that errors will cancel out when aggregating data.

At this point, it must be noted again that the main problem is that, up to now, sentiment approaches adopted when predicting elections from Twitter data have been unnecessarily simple and not representative of the state of the art in sentiment analysis. In other words, most of the research up to this day has been approached in a tentative way and, therefore, the sentiment analysis applied was rudimentary and achieved subpar accuracy. Arguably, applying state-of-the-art methods much better predictions could be achieved and, hence, the adaptation of better methods of sentiment analysis is still an open challenge in this field of research.
Performance Evaluation

Evaluation Measures. The final question regarding electoral prediction methods is how to evaluate them. Needless to say, the actual outcome of the elections is needed, but there is little consensus in the literature about which information to consider as such outcome. Some researchers have only considered the winner of the election without any other consideration; others have considered the number of seats achieved in congress or senate, while others have considered the actual vote sharing.

Moreover, except for local elections, predictions can be computed and evaluated at different levels (e.g., national, state, or district) and, besides, depending on the subtleties of the electoral system the popular vote may differ widely from the number of seats achieved or even the final results of the elections (think for instance of the Electoral College in the United States or the impact of the D'Hondt method where applied).

Current research has produced predictions mainly at national level (Bermingham & Smeaton, 2011; Ceron, Curini, Iacus, & Porro 2013; Jungherr et al., 2011; Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, & Jiang, 2012; Tjong Kim Sang & Bos, 2012; Tumasjan et al., 2010) with a couple of papers focusing at state level (Gayo-Avello, 2011; Metaxas, Mustafaraj, & Gayo-Avello, 2011).

Those predictions have been evaluated against vote rates (Bermingham & Smeaton, 2011; Ceron et al. 2013; Gayo-Avello, 2011; Jungherr et al., 2011; Metaxas et al., 2011; Skoric et al., 2012; Tumasjan et al., 2010); against number of seats (Tjong Kim Sang & Bos, 2012); and also as dichotomous decisions (Metaxas et al., 2011).

When predicting vote rates, mean absolute error (MAE) is normally used to measure accuracy. This is not necessarily the best option, especially since MAE values are not comparable across different elections. For instance, the Senate election in Kentucky was correctly predicted with an MAE of 39.6%, while an MAE of 6.3% produced an incorrect prediction in California (see Table 1). Despite of this obvious problem, MAE is a pretty well-known measure that allows researchers to compare their method’s performance against that of preelectoral polls for a given election. Future research should look for better measures than MAE to evaluate performance of this kind of methods, especially across different elections. In this regard, researchers could start with measures such as $R^2$, standard error of estimate, or root mean squared error (cf. Lewis-Beck, 2005).

Another common way to measure performance is the number of correctly guessed races or, simply put, predicting the winner. This approach is appealing because of its simplicity, but it can be misleading since no information is provided about how far or close the prediction was from the actual results; besides, it greatly depends on the granularity of the prediction. For instance, Gayo-Avello (2011) predicted an Obama victory in the United States which, according to this performance criterion, was correct; however, that prediction included a victory in Texas, which was obviously wrong. By just changing the granularity level and the evaluation method, a negative result could have been turned into a promising one; it seems reasonable to argue that future research requires stronger evaluation criteria, so that the same results cannot admit two opposing readings.

In addition to that, in the following subsection, it will be discussed that predicting the winner is, most of the times, not a great achievement on itself and that a credible baseline must be provided for comparison. Moreover, experts in traditional electoral forecasting also advise against using the winner as a way to judge a given prediction (Campbell, 2004); indeed, the desirable outcome for any electoral prediction should be the vote percentage.

On the Appropriateness of Baselines. The two usual ways of reporting performance of a Twitter-based electoral prediction method have a common issue: the lack of reasonable baselines against which to compare in order to report relative performance. This was first stated by Metaxas et al. (2011) who, with regard to winner prediction, suggested that:
Table 3. Performance Measured as Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for a Naive Baseline Predicting Past Vote Rates Will Happen Again and the Two Different Kinds of Twitter Predictions (i.e., Those Based on Tweet Counts and Those Relying on Sentiment Analysis).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Twitter Prediction (Tweet Counts)</th>
<th>Twitter Prediction (Sentiment Analysis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. presidential election, 2008</td>
<td>5.86% (states analyzed in Gayo-Avello, 2011)</td>
<td>15.87% (computed for this article from data by Gayo-Avello, 2011)</td>
<td>13.10%; 11.61% when debiasing according to age (Gayo-Avello, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German federal election, 2009</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>1.65% (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe, 2010); from 1.51% to 3.34% (Jungherr, Jürgens, and Schoen, 2011)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. elections, 2010</td>
<td>8.85% (states analyzed in Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and Gayo-Avello, 2011)</td>
<td>17.12% (Metaxas et al., 2011)</td>
<td>7.58% (Metaxas et al., 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish general election, 2011</td>
<td>6.26%</td>
<td>5.58% (Bermingham and Smeaton, 2011)</td>
<td>3.67% includes polling data (Bermingham and Smeaton, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singaporean general election, 2011</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>5.23% (Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, and Jiang, 2012)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch senate election, 2011</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>0.89% raw counts; 1.33% normalized counts (computed for this article by the author from data by Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012)</td>
<td>2% normalized counts plus debiasing (computed for this article by the author from data by Tjong Kim Sang and Bos, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French presidential election, 2nd round, 2012</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>3.26% (Ceron et al., 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French legislative elections, 1st round, 2012</td>
<td>4.68%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2.38% (Ceron et al., 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Those methods outperforming the baseline appear shaded.
Given that, historically, the incumbent candidate gets re-elected about 9 out of 10 times, the baseline for any competent predictor should be the incumbent re-election rate.

Under the light of such assumption, it seems clear that a method that correctly guesses 50% of the races in one election is quite far from competent. With regard to vote rate prediction, this author is not aware of any baseline akin to the previous one; nevertheless, it seems plausible to use the results of the immediately prior election as a prediction. Clearly, this has got some issues: For example, there are no prior results for new parties running for election, or for coalitions created or dismantled between elections. Anyway, that baseline is simple to implement and it can provide an easily understandable measure of the relative performance of a given method. In addition to that, even when using a measure with known issues as MAE, it is possible to check if a given prediction method is outperforming or underperforming the baseline. Therefore, such a baseline has been used to produce the data in Table 3 and to discuss the performance of the surveyed methods when predicting different elections. Both the table and the discussion appear in the following subsection.

On the Feasibility of Predicting Elections From Twitter Data

Table 1 describes 16 different attempts to predict elections based on Twitter data. About half of them were successful, one was the result reported by Tumasjan et al. (2010)—strongly contested by Jungherr et al. (2011)—others correspond to predictions in the paper by Metaxas et al. (2011) who, in turn, were able to predict just half of the races; and finally, Ceron et al. (2013) were able to predict with reasonable accuracy both the second round of the French presidential elections and the first round of the French legislative elections. The rest of the studies failed their predictions by wide margins. Taking into account that in most of the studied elections there were only two parties (or candidates) with actual possibilities of winning the race, a 50% performance seems close to mere chance.

When any measure of performance was reported in those papers, it was MAE that, as said, does not allow for comparison neither across papers nor across races in the same election. Hence, to better understand the actual performance of published methods and to make comparisons among them, a new baseline was suggested in previous section: assuming that past vote rates from the immediately prior election would happen again. This way, any method underperforming (e.g., applying MAE) such a baseline should be considered unsuccessful. Thus, performance measures were computed for each of the elections studied in the literature for (1) the proposed baseline, (2) Twitter predictions based on tweet counts, and (3) Twitter predictions based on sentiment analysis where available. Fortunately, all of the papers, except for Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012) directly provide such information. In the later case, it was computed from the results reported by the authors (seats in the Senate). Table 3 shows those performance measures that have been used to draw some conclusions about the predictive power of currently applied methods.

On the Feasibility of Counting Tweets to Predict Elections. There are three reports where predictions based on tweet counts outperform the baseline: Tumasjan et al. (2010); Bermingham and Smeaton (2011); and Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012). Other three reports reveal that such a method underperforms the baseline: Gayo-Avello (2011); Metaxas et al. (2011); and Skoric et al. (2012).

Those results are not very conclusive and it could be argued that positive results are an artifact due to mere chance. On top of that, Jungherr et al. (2011) showed that (1) prior important decisions regarding which parties to monitor are to be taken and (2) performance strongly depends on the time window employed for data collection. In fact, by including the Pirate Party, Jungherr et al. showed that predicted results were very different. Actually, all the researchers who have replicated the method by Tumasjan et al. (2010) discharged minor parties—including those teams that underperformed the proposed baseline.
So, in short, Twitter prediction based on tweet counts:

1. Is too dependent on arbitrary decisions such as the parties or candidates to be considered, or the selection of a period to collect the data.
2. Its performance is too unstable because it strongly depends on such parameterizations.
3. Considering the reported results as a whole we should not disregard the hypothesis that positive results could have been due to chance or, even, to unintentional data dredging due to post hoc analysis.

Under the light of current research, there is no strong evidence to consider tweet counting as a reliable prediction method. However, given its simplicity, it would be wise to apply it to as many elections and scenarios as possible to definitely check if the method can or cannot consistently outperform the baselines.

On the Feasibility of Using Sentiment Analysis to Predict Elections. It is unclear the impact that sentiment analysis has on Twitter-based predictions. The studies applying that technique are much fewer than those counting tweets and the picture they convey is confusing to say the least. On top of that, as it was aforementioned, all of the so-called sentiment analysis methods applied are not representative of state-of-the-art techniques in the field and, thus, they achieve subpar accuracy.

According to Gayo-Avello (2011), lexicon-based sentiment analysis outperforms tweet counting, but it still underperforms the baseline. Metaxas et al. (2011) found again that the same method outperforms raw tweet counts, but also the baseline. However, they also found that lexicon-based methods are close to random classifiers and that the proportion of correctly guessed races is no better than chance.

Results in Bermingham and Smeaton (2011) and Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012) introduce some contradictions. The former found that sentiment analysis outperforms the baseline, but their method was somewhat overfitted since they incorporated data from preelectoral polls. Results by the second authors reveal that their most complex method (involving not only sentiment analysis but also political leaning information derived from preelectoral polls) outperforms the baseline but, at the same time, underperforms raw tweet counts.

Finally, results by Ceron et al. (2013) regarding the French legislative and presidential elections are rather promising. Certainly, their method still underperforms traditional polls, but the error is comparable to them; the fact that vote prediction for left parties was overestimated, while for far right parties it was underestimated seems to point out the method is sensible to ideological or self-selection biases in Twitter data. Anyway, it is one of the first studies successfully applying a state-of-the-art method of sentiment analysis to the problem.

In short, results are still scarce and some of them even contradictory. However, most of the initial studies relied on naive methods of sentiment analysis and, probably, that could explain their wide errors. More recent works applying better methods of sentiment analysis seem to be improving the accuracy of the predictions and, hence, it is clear that further research regarding the application of state-of-the-art sentiment analysis to this field is needed.

Conclusion

This article concludes enumerating the main weaknesses of current research regarding political prediction with Twitter data. Then a number of recommendations for future research are provided.

Weaknesses in Current Research

The previous analysis of the literature revealed that the predictive power of Twitter regarding political elections has been somewhat overstated. Certainly, no single paper has claimed to completely
solve the problem; however, a few of them have made flamboyant claims supported by thin evidence, and the research community has many times taken out of context positive findings in single case scenarios while forgetting the many remaining issues. Moreover, it is almost unavoidable to attribute some of the reported positive results to mere chance or involuntary data dredging since all of the results were obtained post facto. Finally, it has been shown that simple baselines can achieve better accuracy in many cases. None of this is surprising, given that approaches up to date suffer from a number of weaknesses that should be tackled with in the future:

1. All of them are post hoc analysis. Even if no data dredging occurred in any of the surveyed studies the only way to dispel such a concern is by conducting the research and publishing the prediction before the elections take place. It must be noted, besides, that this condition has been emphasized by experts in traditional electoral forecasting; according to them, models must have lead, that is, “the forecast must be made before the event. The farther in advance [ . . . ] the better” (Lewis-Beck, 2005).

2. Performance should be compared against reasonable baselines. It has been shown that commonly reported measures of performance are either inadequate (winner prediction) or not comparable across elections (MAE). Hence, different measures should be studied and, in addition to that, better baselines are needed to compare new methods against them. It has been shown that incumbency is a reasonable one when predicting a number of races and that using results from the previous election is a sensible choice when predicting vote rates for a single election. Nevertheless, additional baselines should be explored and this point is covered in the following subsection.

3. Sentiment analysis is applied with naïveté. Commonly used methods are slightly better than random classifiers and fail to catch the subtleties of political discourse. State-of-the-art methods in sentiment analysis should be applied if the prediction method claims to be based on voter sentiment; humor and sarcasm should also be taken into consideration. On another hand, if the method claims to be noise tolerant and, thus, it ignores sentiment or polarity in the tweets it should demonstrate that it consistently works and outperforms the baseline in different elections. In other words, single case studies are not useful to proof or disproof the feasibility of a given method.

4. All of the tweets are assumed to be trustworthy when it is not the case. This issue is highly related with the previous one: Noise tolerance cannot be assumed at face value but demonstrated with consistent predictions across different elections; on another hand, if the method applies sentiment analysis then spam, misleading propaganda and astroturfing should be detected and filtered out or the method should be tolerant to that noise.

5. Demographics bias is ignored even when it is well known that social media is not a random sample of the population. As it has been shown, some of the methods claiming to be noise tolerant implicitly treat bias as a kind of noise; bias tolerance could be much more difficult to proof but, as with noise tolerance, single-case positive reports would be weak arguments to support such a claim. Furthermore, those researchers aiming to replicate traditional polling should achieve material improvements when incorporating demographic information and debiasing methods.

6. Self-selection bias is simply ignored. People tweet on a voluntary basis and, therefore, data are produced by those politically active. This issue is slightly related to the previous one and, hence, those researchers claiming their methods are noise tolerant should do their best to proof their methods are consistently immune to this additional kind of bias. Conversely, advocates of replicating traditional polls with Twitter data should be able to offer ways to circumvent this problem, and not simply use it as a blanket argument against the general feasibility of predicting elections using Twitter data.
Challenges and Lines for Future Work

Probably, the main challenge that this area of research should face is to settle down whether prediction based on Twitter data can actually be noise and bias tolerant or if, on the contrary, it should replicate actual polls and, hence, attention should be paid to geographical and demographical issues, in addition to other problems, specific to social media, such as spam, astroturfing, and self-selection. As it has been shown, researchers claiming Twitter-based methods can be noise and bias tolerant do not provide strong proof to support such claims but just single-case positive results (that most of the time cannot be replicated in different elections). Nevertheless, this fact does not disproof the general idea of devising a noise and bias tolerant method.

Either way, it is simply not possible to ignore any more those kinds of noise and bias and, instead, anyone claiming a method is tolerant to both issues should (1) apply the proposed method to different scenarios where the nature of noise and bias is completely different (e.g., scenarios where the overrepresented ideologies differ; where the prevailing demographic groups are quite different in terms of age, education, race, or income; or where the astroturfing is produced by very different groups), (2) compare the collected data with the features of the actual population to reveal the leaning of Twitter users for each scenario, and (3) proof that the same method achieves accurate predictions when working on such different scenarios.

On the other hand, those researchers claiming that a faithful replication of traditional polls is required should clearly show the ways in which they tackle with (1) noise (i.e., spam, misleading propaganda, and astroturfing), (2) self-selection bias (i.e., some users not revealing their opinion and different communities reacting to different events), (3) detection of likely voters, and (4) deweighting of demographical biases in the users appearing in their data. Those methods should consistently work across different scenarios and they should consistently outperform a similar method which ignored noise and biases in Twitter data. Needless to say, geographical and demographical information about the users should be inferred if not available (e.g., Mahmud, Nichols, & Drews, 2012; Pennacchiotti & Popescu, 2011).

Each of those approaches starts from very different assumptions but, up to now, there is no strong evidence in favor of one over the other. Needless to say, it seems sensible to assume that one needs to outperform the other and, hence, this matter needs to be settled down in the short term.

It must be noted that the method of inferring voting intention from the data is reasonably independent from either approach. Both can apply from simple tweet counting to sophisticated sentiment analysis methods. As it has been already said, there is no strong support on favor of tweet counting as a prediction method; however, it would be wise to apply it in every case to eventually determine if it can be discarded as a prediction method. With regard to sentiment analysis, it is clear that lexicon-based methods should not be employed and that, instead, state-of-the-art sentiment analysis should be applied with a focus on the many issues of political tweets such as spam, astroturfing, humor, and sarcasm.

Finally, there is the matter of the nature of the prediction and the way to evaluate its accuracy. Winner prediction and number of correctly guessed races should be avoided in the future and, instead, predicted vote rates should be provided. This option should be preferred over number of seats or number of Electoral College votes given that, this way, subtle differences among electoral systems can be safely ignored. With regard to the granularity of the prediction, researchers should aim to provide predictions at the highest possible resolution and, at least, one level below the national one. Regarding performance evaluation, MAE should be reported since it is a well-known and easily understandable measure; however, on the light of the aforementioned issues it exhibits other measures should be analyzed. In addition to that, MAE should not be reported on its own but instead compared to the MAE (or other measure of error) of a reasonable baseline. In this regard, using past vote rates could be an option but traditional forecasting methods could also be
used as baselines—see Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) and Campbell and Garand (2000). This way, Twitter-based methods could proof if they are competitive with other well-established forecasting approaches.

In this regard, it must be noted that traditional forecasting models are regression models obtained from historical data and, hence, the same approach can be applied when working with Twitter data. In fact, there are a couple of recent works that have tried to obtain regression models by combining preelectoral polls with Twitter data.

Shi, Agarwal, Agrawal, Garg, and Spoelstra (2012) applied such a method to Republican primaries in 2011. Their model included aggregated features obtained from Twitter during the campaign such as number of tweets and retweets or the number of followers a given candidate had got; they did not use the actual tweet contents, however. Their regression model was fit and tested against poll results in Realclearpolitics website; they used the first 90% of the poll time series for training and the remaining 10% for testing achieving rather reasonable results. It must be noted that these authors employed the same Twitter data to make predictions using both tweet counting and lexicon-based sentiment analysis achieving much poorer results than when using their regression model.

A similar work was later developed by Lamos, Preotiuc-Pietro, and Cohn (2013). They employed results from voting intention polls as training material for their model that combined both the tweets contents with user information into one single model. According to these authors, intention inferred by their method outperform forecasts made from the available polls.

Both reports are quite promising and they are opening a path for future research that would help integrate it with traditional electoral forecasting. Needless to say, further work is needed. First, it would be of interest to work in a similar fashion to that of traditional forecasting models; that is, obtaining a model not from one single election but from data corresponding to a series of elections. Second, this kind of models should be generalized to be applied to different elections in different countries with comparable electoral systems and similar Twitter usage.

Final Note

Electoral prediction from Twitter data should acknowledge self-selection bias (e.g., Mustafaraj, Finn, Whitlock, & Metaxas, 2011 or Mitchell & Hitlin, 2013), the presence of spam and astroturfing (e.g., Mustafaraj & Metaxas, 2010 or Ratkiewicz et al., 2011), and the prevalence of negative comments plagued with humor and sarcasm (Mejova, Srinivasan, & Boynton, 2013).

Moreover, methods to infer the size of silent majorities should be explored (e.g., Venkataraman, Subbalakshmi, & Chandramouli, 2012) in addition to those to filter out misleading information (e.g., Castillo, Mendoza, & Poblete, 2011). This should be taken into account no matter the prediction method is claimed to be noise tolerant or not. In the first case, the level of noise and the degree of bias from the actual population should be assessed to proof whether the accuracy of the method is unaffected by them. In the second case, all of those methods could be used to filter out the noise and remove the sources of bias.

If sentiment analysis is applied, state-of-the-art methods are required (cf. Pang & Lee, 2008 or Liu, 2012), and humor and sarcasm should be either filtered out (e.g., Reyes, Rosso, & Buscaldi, 2012) or the method should be tolerant to their presence.

Finally, well-established forecasting methods from the political science literature (cf. Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1992 and Campbell & Garand, 2000) should be used as baselines in order to provide convincing evidence of the competitiveness of the new proposed methods. In this regard, it could be wise to take an approach similar to that followed in political science and propose regression-based methods able to be applied in many different scenarios instead of single-case models. In fact, the final goal of this line of research should be to integrate Twitter-based electoral prediction within the area of electoral forecasting from political science.
Appendix: An Annotated Bibliography

This section covers the papers on electoral prediction analyzed above and, additionally, works on related areas such as credibility, rumors, and Twitter demographics.

Electoral Prediction From Twitter Data

O’Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, and Smith (2010)

This is the earliest article discussing the feasibility of using Twitter data as a substitute for traditional polls although it does not describe any prediction method.

They employed a subjectivity lexicon to determine a positive and a negative score for each tweet in their data set. Then, raw numbers of positive and negative tweets are used to compute a sentiment score.

Using that method, sentiment time series were prepared for a number of topics (namely, consumer confidence, presidential approval, and United States 2008 Presidential elections). Both consumer confidence and presidential approval polls exhibited correlation with Twitter sentiment data, but no correlation was found with electoral polls.

Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe (2010); Jungherr et al. (2011); and Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe (2011)

The first article started the whole line of research analyzed in this work and proposed MAE as a measure of performance. It has two distinct parts: In the first one, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count is used to perform an analysis of the tweets related to different parties running for the German 2009 Federal election. In the second part, the authors state that the mere count of tweets mentioning a party accurately reflected the election results with a performance close to that of actual polls.

That claim was rebutted by Jungherr et al. (2011) who pointed out that the method required arbitrary choices (e.g., not taking into account all the parties running for the elections) and that its results depended on the selected time window.

Tumasjan et al. (2011) tried to dispel those doubts. Unfortunately, their counterarguments are not compelling enough and, besides, they toned down their previous conclusions: saying that Twitter data are not to replace polls but to complement them; or stating that the prediction method was not their main contribution.

Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and Gayo-Avello (2011)

With Jungherr et al. (2011), this is one of the few articles casting doubts on the predictive powers of Twitter. After analyzing results from a number of elections, they concluded that Twitter data are slightly better than chance when predicting elections. Hence, they suggested the use of incumbency as a baseline.

They also described three necessary standards for any method claiming predictive power: (1) it should be an algorithm, (2) it should take into account the demographic bias in Twitter’s user base, and (3) it should be “explainable,” that is, black box approaches should be avoided.

Livne, Simmons, Adar, and Adamic (2011)

This is not a prediction method since it does not rely on users’ tweets but in those by candidates plus their social graph. They also incorporate additional information such as the party a candidate belongs to, or incumbency.
They claim 88% precision when incorporating Twitter data (both tweets and graph) versus 81% precision without such data; the improvement is not substantial although noticeable.

Finally, it must be noted that elections are modeled as binary processes, so important information is missed (such as in tight elections or scenarios with coalitions).

Bermingham and Smeaton (2011)

This article discusses different approaches to incorporate sentiment analysis to a predictive method. The method was put to test with the 2011 Irish General Election revealing it was not competitive against traditional polls.

Gayo-Avello (2011)

This article describes how different methods failed to predict the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election since they predicted an Obama victory in every state, including Texas. The methods were those proposed in Tumasjan et al. (2010) and O’Connor et al. (2010) and a postmortem on the reasons for such a failure is provided.

A number of problems are suggested: (1) The “file-drawer” effect; (2) Twitter data are biased and unrepresentative; and (3) the sentiment analyzers commonly used are only slightly better than random classifiers.

Tjong Kim Sang and Bos (2012)

In this paper, Twitter data regarding the 2011 Dutch Senate elections were analyzed. They found that tweet counting is a bad predictor and that sentiment analysis can improve performance.

Nevertheless, performance is below that of traditional polls and, moreover, the method relies to some extent on that polling data to correct for demographic bias.

Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, and Jiang (2012)

Similarly to previous article, this one also shows that there is certain correlation between Twitter chatter and votes but not enough to make accurate predictions—they found performance was much worse than that reported in Tumasjan et al. (2010).

They argue that Twitter can provide a somewhat reasonable glimpse on national results, but it fails when focusing on local levels. Hence, in addition to the technical caveats, they discuss problems such as democratic maturity of the country, competitiveness of the election, and media freedom.

Ceron, Curini, Iacus, and Porro (2013)

This article applied supervised sentiment analysis to determine the popularity of Italian political leaders during 2011 and to predict the outcome of the French presidential and legislative elections. In the later two cases, the authors collected tweets related to the candidates and parties running for election during 1 week before the election; then, they applied to those tweets the sentiment analysis method devised by Hopkins and King (2010) to find the vote rate for each candidate or party. Their results were worse than those of traditional polls in terms of MAE but still pretty reasonable. An issue with their method is that it seems to be sensible to ideological or self-selection biases in Twitter since the vote rate for far left parties was overestimated, while the vote rate for far right parties was underestimated.
Sources of Bias in Twitter

Mislove, Lehmann, Ahn, Onnela, and Rosenquist (2011)

This article analyzes a sample of Twitter users in the United States along three different axes, namely, geography, gender, and race/ethnicity.

The methods applied are simple albeit compelling. All of the data were inferred from the user profiles: Geographical information was obtained from the self-reported location; gender was determined using the first name, and statistical data from the U.S. Social Security Administration; and the last name and data from the U.S. Census were used to derive race/ethnicity.

Clearly, such methods are prone to error, but it is probably rather tolerable and the conclusions of the study are sensible: Highly populated counties are overrepresented, users are predominantly male, and Twitter is a nonrandom sample with regard to race/ethnicity.

They concluded that post hoc corrections based on the over- and underrepresentation of different groups could be applied to improve predictions based on Twitter data.

Mustafaraj, Finn, Whitlock, and Metaxas (2011)

This paper provides compelling evidence on the existence of two extremely different behaviors in social media: on one hand, there is a minority of users producing most of the content (vocal minority); and on the other there is a majority of users who hardly produce any content (silent majority).

These two groups are clearly separated and the vocal minority behaves as a resonance chamber spreading information aligned with their own opinions. Thus, they suggest extreme caution when building predictive models based on social media.

Mitchell and Hitlin (2013)

This report reveals that the reaction of Twitter user does not correlate with public opinion (in the United States) and, on top of that, it is not consistent. That is, for some events, the reaction of Twitter users denotes a more liberal leaning that the population as a whole, while for other events the reaction is much more conservative. The report emphasizes the fact that Twitter reach is modest among the population and, moreover, Twitter users are not representative of the public: They are younger and more liberal. In addition to that, the report attributes part of the inconsistency on Twitter reactions to self-selection bias: that is, users reacting to some topics are not sharing their views with regard to other topics.

Denoising Twitter Data

Mustafaraj and Metaxas (2010)

This article introduces the concept of “Twitter-bomb”: the use of fake accounts in Twitter to spread disinformation by “bombing” targeted users who, in turn, would retweet the message achieving viral diffusion.

They describe a smear campaign orchestrated by a Republican group against Democrat candidate Martha Coakley and how it was detected and aborted.

Ratkiewicz et al. (2011)

This article describes the Truthy project inspired by the previous article. Truthy is a system to detect astroturf political campaigns either to simulate widespread support for a candidate or to spread disinformation. The system is described in detail and a number of cases and performance analysis are provided.
Castillo, Mendoza, and Poblete (2011) and Morris, Counts, Roseway, Hoff, and Schwarz (2012)

The first article is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one describing a method to separate credible from not credible tweets. It describes in detail which features to extract from the tweets to then train a classifier.

Morris et al. (2012) did not develop an automatic method to filter tweets, but they conducted a survey to find the features that make users to perceive a tweet as credible. Content alone was found to be not enough to assess truthfulness so users rely on additional heuristics. These can be manipulated by the authors of tweets and, therefore, can affect credibility perceptions.

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Notes
1. It would be interesting to study the application of methods to infer political leaning of users to select likely voters.
2. This effect refers to those conservative voters not disclosing their intentions in polls and, thus, biasing the corresponding predictions for conservative vote.
4. As it has been shown in the commented bibliography, O’Connor et al. (2010) and Livne, Simmons, Adar, and Adamic (2011) were not actually predictions.
5. Even when the phrase “predicting elections with Twitter” prominently appears in the title of that paper.

References


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