

Manipulation-resistant Reputations Using Hitting Time^{*}

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Abstract. Popular reputation systems for linked networks can be manipulated by spammers who strategically place links. The reputation of node v is interpreted as the world's opinion of v 's importance. In PageRank [4], v 's own opinion can be seen to have considerable influence on her reputation, where v expresses a high opinion of herself by participating in short directed cycles. In contrast, we show that expected hitting time — the time to reach v in a random walk — measures essentially the same quantity as PageRank, but excludes v 's opinion. We make these notions precise, and show that a reputation system based on hitting time resists tampering by individuals or groups who strategically place outlinks. We also present an algorithm to efficiently compute hitting time for all nodes in a massive graph; conventional algorithms do not scale adequately.

1 Introduction

Reputation and ranking systems are an essential part of web search and e-commerce. The general idea is that the reputation of one participant is determined by the endorsements of others; for example, one web page endorses another by linking to it. However, not all participants are honorable — e.g., spammers will do their best to manipulate a search engine's rankings. A natural requirement for a reputation system is that individuals should not be able to improve their own reputation using simple self-endorsement strategies, like participating in short cycles to boost PageRank. Since PageRank enjoys many nice properties, it is instructive to see where things go wrong.

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a directed graph (e.g, the web). PageRank assigns a score $\pi(v)$ to each node v , where π is defined to be the stationary distribution of a random walk on G , giving the pleasing interpretation that the score of page v is the fraction of time a web surfer spends there if she randomly follows links forever. For technical reasons, the random walk is modified to restart in each step with probability α , jumping to a page chosen uniformly at random. This ensures that π exists and is efficient to compute. Then a well-known fact about

^{*} This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0514429, and by the AFOSR under Award No. FA9550-07-1-0124. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF) or the AFOSR.

Markov chains [1] says that $1/\pi(v)$ is equal to the expected *return time* of v , the number of steps it takes a random walk starting at v to return to v . A heuristic argument for this equivalence is that a walk returning to v every r steps on average should spend $1/r$ of all time steps there.

Despite its popularity as a ranking system, one can easily manipulate return time by changing *only outlinks*. Intuitively, a node v should link only to nodes from which a random walk will return to v quickly (in expectation). By partnering with just one other node to form a 2-cycle with no other outlinks, v ensures a return in two steps — the minimum possible without self-loops — unless the walk jumps first. In this fashion, v can often boost its PageRank by a factor of 3 to 4 for typical settings of α [6]. However, this strategy relies on manipulating the portion of the walk before the first jump: the jump destination is independent of v 's outlinks, and return time is determined once the walk reaches v again, so v 's outlinks have no further effect. This suggests eliminating the initial portion of the walk and measuring reputation by the time to hit v following a restart, called the *hitting time* of node v from the restart distribution. This paper develops a reputation system based on hitting time that is provably resistant to manipulation. Our main contributions are:

- In Theorem 1, we develop a precise relationship between expected return time and expected hitting time in a random walk with restart, and show that the expected hitting time of v is equal to $(1 - p)/\alpha p$, where p is the probability that v is reached before the first restart. We will adopt p as our measure of the reputation of v .
- We prove that the resulting reputation system resists manipulation, using a natural definition of influence. For example, node v has a limited amount of influence that depends on her reputation, and she may spread that influence using outlinks to increase others' reputations. However, node v cannot alter her own reputation with outlinks, nor can she damage w 's reputation by more than her original influence on w . Furthermore, the advantage that v gains by purchasing new nodes, often called *sybils* of v , is limited by the restart probability of the sybils.
- We present an efficient algorithm to simultaneously compute hitting time for all nodes. In addition to one PageRank calculation, our algorithm uses Monte Carlo sampling with running time that is linear in $|V|$ for given accuracy and confidence parameters. This is a significant improvement over traditional algorithms, which require a large-scale computation for each node.¹

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss related work. In section 3 we present Theorem 1, giving the characterization of hitting time that is the foundation for the following sections. In section 4 we develop a reputation system using hitting time and show that it is resistant to manipulation. In section 5 we present our algorithm for hitting time.

¹ Standard techniques can simultaneously compute hitting time from all possible sources to a single target node using a system of linear equations. However, what is desired for reputation systems is the hitting time from one source, or in this case a distribution, to all possible targets.

2 Related Work

Since the introduction of PageRank [4], it has been adapted to a variety of applications, including personalized web search [22], web spam detection [14], and trust systems in peer-to-peer networks [17]. Each of these uses the same general formulation and our work applies to all of them.

Much work has focused on the PageRank system itself, studying computation methods, convergence properties, stability and sensitivity, and, of course, implementation techniques. See [18] for a survey of this wide body of work. Computationally, the Monte Carlo methods in [8] and [2] are similar to our algorithms for hitting time. They use a probabilistic formulation of PageRank in terms of a *short* random walk that permits efficient sampling. In particular, we will use the same idea as [8] to efficiently implement many random walks simultaneously in a massive graph, without requiring random access.

Recent works have addressed the manipulability of PageRank: how can a group of selfish nodes place outlinks to optimize their PageRank, and how can we detect such nodes [3, 6, 11–13, 20, 23]? In particular, [3, 6, 12] all describe the manipulation strategy mentioned in the introduction.

For a more general treatment of reputation systems in the presence of strategic agents, see [9] for a nice overview with some specific results from the literature. Cheng and Friedman [5] prove an impossibility result that relates to our work — a wide class of reputation systems (including ours) cannot be resistant to a particular attack called the *sybil attack* [7]. However, their definition of resistance is very strong, requiring that no node can improve its ranking using a sybil attack; our results can be viewed as positive results under a relaxation of this requirement by limiting the damage caused by a sybil attack. We will discuss sybils in section 4.3.

Hitting time is a classical quantity of interest in Markov chains. See chapter 2 of [1] for an overview. The exact terminology and definitions vary slightly: we define hitting time as a random variable, but sometimes it is defined as the expectation of the same random variable. Also, the term *first passage time* is sometimes used synonymously. In a context similar to ours, hitting time was used as a measure of proximity between nodes to predict link formation in a social network [19]; also, the node similarity measure in [16] can be formulated in terms of hitting time.

Finally, the relationship between hitting time and return time in a random walk with restart is related to regenerative stochastic processes. In fact, Theorem 1 can be derived as a special case of a general result about such processes. See equation (15) in [15] and the references therein for details.

3 Characterizing Hitting Time

This section paves the way toward a reputation system based on hitting time by stating and proving Theorem 1. Part (i) of the theorem relates expected hitting time to expected return time — the two are essentially the same *except* for

nodes where the random walk is likely to return before jumping, the sign of a known manipulation strategy. Part (ii) proves that the expected hitting time of v is completely determined by the probability that v is reached before the first jump; this will lead to precise notions of manipulation-resistance in section 4.

3.1 Preliminaries

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a directed graph. Consider the *standard random walk* on G , where the first node is chosen from starting distribution q , then at each step the walk follows an outgoing link from the current node chosen uniformly at random. Let $\{X_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ be the sequence of nodes visited by the walk. Then $\Pr[X_0 = v] = q(v)$, and $\Pr[X_t = v \mid X_{t-1} = u] = 1/\text{outdegree}(u)$ if $(u, v) \in E$, and zero otherwise. Here, we require $\text{outdegree}(u) > 0$.² Now, suppose the walk is modified to restart with probability α at each step, meaning the next node is chosen from the starting distribution (henceforth, *restart distribution*) instead of following a link. The new transition probabilities are:

$$\Pr[X_t = v \mid X_{t-1} = u] = \begin{cases} \alpha q(v) + \frac{1-\alpha}{\text{outdegree}(u)} & \text{if } (u, v) \in E \\ \alpha q(v) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

We call this the α -*random walk* on G , and we parametrize quantities of interest by the restart probability α . A typical setting is $\alpha = 0.15$, so a jump occurs every $1/.15 \approx 7$ steps in expectation. The *hitting time* of v is $H_\alpha(v) = \min\{t : X_t = v\}$. The *return time* of v is $R_\alpha(v) = \min\{t \geq 1 : X_t = v \mid X_0 = v\}$. When v is understood, we simply write H_α and R_α . We write H and R for the hitting time and return time in a standard random walk.

3.2 Theorem 1

Before stating Theorem 1, we make the useful observation that we can split the α -random walk into two independent parts: (1) the portion preceding the first jump is the beginning of a standard random walk, and (2) the portion following the first jump is an α -random walk independent of the first portion. The probability that the first jump occurs at time t is $(1 - \alpha)^{t-1}\alpha$, i.e., the first jump time J is a geometric random variable with parameter α , independent of the nodes visited by the walk. Then we can model the α -random walk as follows: (1) start a standard random walk, (2) independently choose the first jump time J from a geometric distribution, and (3) at time J begin a new α -random walk. Hence we can express the return time and hitting time of v recursively:

$$R_\alpha = \begin{cases} R & \text{if } R < J \\ J + H'_\alpha & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad H_\alpha = \begin{cases} H & \text{if } H < J \\ J + H'_\alpha & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \quad (1)$$

Here H'_α is an independent copy of H_α . It is convenient to abstract from our specific setting and state Theorem 1 about general random variables of this form.

² This is a technical condition that can be resolved in a variety of ways, for example, by adding self-loops to nodes with no outlinks.

Theorem 1. *Let R and H be independent, nonnegative, integer-valued random variables, and let J be a geometric random variable with parameter α . Define R_α and H_α as in (1). Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} (i) \quad E[R_\alpha] &= \Pr[R \geq J] \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} + E[H_\alpha] \right), \\ (ii) \quad E[H_\alpha] &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\Pr[H \geq J]}{\Pr[H < J]}, \\ (iii) \quad E[R_\alpha] &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{\Pr[R \geq J]}{\Pr[H < J]}. \end{aligned}$$

Part (i) relates expected return time to expected hitting time: $\Pr[R \geq J]$ is the probability that the walk does not return before jumping. On the web, for example, we expect $\Pr[R \geq J]$ to be close to 1 for most pages, so the two measures are roughly equivalent. However, pages attempting to optimize PageRank can drive $\Pr[R \geq J]$ much lower, achieving an expected return time that is much lower than expected hitting time.

For parts (ii) and (iii), we adopt the convention that $\Pr[H < J] = 0$ implies $E[H_\alpha] = E[R_\alpha] = \infty$, corresponding to the case when v is not reachable from any node with positive restart probability. To gain some intuition for part (ii) (part (iii) is similar), we can think of the random walk as a sequence of independent explorations from the restart distribution “looking” for node v . Each exploration succeeds in finding v with probability $\Pr[H < J]$, so the expected number of explorations until success is $1/\Pr[H < J]$. The expected number of steps until an exploration is terminated by a jump is $1/\alpha$, so a rough estimate of hitting time is $\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{1}{\Pr[H < J]}$. Of course, this is an overestimate because the final exploration is cut short when v is reached, and the expected length of an exploration conditioned on not reaching v is slightly shorter than $1/\alpha$. It turns out that $\Pr[H \geq J]$ is exactly the factor needed to correct the estimate, due to the useful fact about geometric random variables³ stated in Lemma 1. We stress that the expected hitting time of v in the α -random walk is completely determined by $\Pr[H < J]$, the probability that a given exploration succeeds; this will serve as our numeric measure of reputation.

Lemma 1. *Let X and J be independent random variables such that X is nonnegative and integer-valued, and J is a geometric random variable with parameter α . Then $E[\min(X, J)] = \frac{1}{\alpha} \Pr[X \geq J]$.*

Lemma 1 is proved in the appendix.

Proof (Theorem 1). We rewrite $R_\alpha = \min(R, J) + I\{R \geq J\}H'_\alpha$, where $I\{R \geq J\}$ is the indicator variable for the event $R \geq J$. Note that $I\{R \geq J\}$ and H'_α are

³ We mentioned that Theorem 1 can be derived from a result about regenerative stochastic processes [15]. In fact, Theorem 1 captures most of the generality; to write recurrences as in (1), the process need not be Markovian, it is only necessary that the process following a restart is a replica of the original. The only non-general assumption made is that J is a geometric random variable; this simplifies the conclusions.

independent. Then, using linearity of expectation and Lemma 1,

$$\begin{aligned} E[R_\alpha] &= E[\min(R, J)] + \Pr[R \geq J] E[H'_\alpha] \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \Pr[R \geq J] + \Pr[R \geq J] E[H_\alpha] \\ &= \Pr[R \geq J] \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} + E[H_\alpha] \right). \end{aligned}$$

This proves part (i). For part (ii), we take R to be a copy of H in part (i), giving

$$E[H_\alpha] = \Pr[H \geq J] \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} + E[H_\alpha] \right).$$

Solving this expression for $E[H_\alpha]$ gives (ii). Part (iii) is obtained by substituting (ii) into (i). \square

4 Manipulation-resistance

In this section we develop a reputation system based on hitting time, and quantify the extent to which an individual can tamper with reputations. It is intuitively clear that node u cannot improve its own hitting time by placing outlinks, but we would also like to limit the damage that u can cause to v 's reputation. Specifically, u should only be able to damage v 's reputation if u was responsible for v 's reputation in the first place. Furthermore, u should not have a great influence on the reputation of too many others. To make these ideas precise, we define reputation using $\Pr[H < J]$ instead of $E[H_\alpha]$. By Theorem 1, either quantity determines the other — they are roughly inversely proportional — and $\Pr[H < J]$ is convenient for reasoning about manipulation.

Definition 1. Let $\text{rep}(v) = \Pr[H(v) < J]$ be the reputation of v .

In words, $\text{rep}(v)$ is the probability that a random walk hits v before jumping. Of all walks that reach v before jumping, an attacker u can only manipulate those that hit u first. This leads to our notion of influence.

Definition 2. Let $\text{infl}(u, v) = \Pr[H(u) < H(v) < J]$ be the influence of u on v .

Definition 3. Let $\text{infl}(u) = \sum_v \text{infl}(u, v)$ be the total influence of u .

When the graph G is not clear from context, we write these quantities as $\Pr_G[\cdot]$, $\text{rep}_G(\cdot)$ and $\text{infl}_G(\cdot, \cdot)$ to be clear. To quantify what can change when u manipulates outlinks, let $\mathcal{N}_u(G)$ be the set of all graphs obtained from G by the addition or deletion of edges originating at u . It is convenient to formalize the intuition that u has no control over the random walk until it hits u for the first time.

Definition 4. Fix a graph G and node u . We say that an event A is u -invariant if $\Pr_G[A] = \Pr_{G'}[A]$ for all $G' \in \mathcal{N}_u(G)$. If A is u -invariant, we also say that the quantity $\Pr[A]$ is u -invariant.

Lemma 2. *An event A is u -invariant if the occurrence or non-occurrence of A is determined by time $H(u)$.*

Lemma 2 is proved in the appendix. With the definitions in place, we can quantify how much u can manipulate reputations.

Theorem 2. *For any graph $G = (V, E)$ and $u, v \in V$,*

- (i) $\text{infl}(u, u) = 0$,
- (ii) $\text{infl}(u, v) \geq 0$,
- (iii) $\text{infl}(u, v) \leq \text{rep}(u)$,
- (iv) $\text{infl}(u) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha} \text{rep}(u)$.

Let $G' \in \mathcal{N}_u(G)$. Then

$$(v) \text{rep}_{G'}(v) = \text{rep}_G(v) + \text{infl}_{G'}(u, v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v).$$

Parts (i)-(iv) bound the influence of u in terms of its reputation. Part (v) states that when u modifies outlinks, the change in v 's reputation is equal to the change in u 's influence on v . Substituting parts (i-iii) into part (v) yields some simple but useful corollaries.

Corollary 1. *Let $G' \in \mathcal{N}_u(G)$. Then*

- (i) $\text{rep}_{G'}(u) = \text{rep}_G(u)$,
- (ii) $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) \geq \text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v)$,
- (iii) $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) \leq \text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v) + \text{rep}_G(u)$.

No matter what actions u takes, it cannot alter its own reputation (part (i)). Nor can u damage the portion of v 's reputation *not* due to u 's influence (part (ii)). On the other hand, u may boost its influence on v , but its final influence cannot exceed its reputation (part (iii)).

Proof (Theorem 2). For the most part, these are simple consequences of the definitions. Parts (i) and (ii) are trivial:

$$\text{infl}(u, u) = \Pr [H(u) < H(u) < J] = 0,$$

$$\text{infl}(u, v) = \Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J] \geq 0.$$

For part (iii), a walk that hits u then v before jumping contributes equally to u 's reputation and u 's influence on v :

$$\text{infl}(u, v) = \Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J] \leq \Pr [H(u) < J] = \text{rep}(u).$$

Part (iv) uses the observation that not too many nodes can be hit after u but before the first jump. Let $L = |\{v : H(u) < H(v) < J\}|$ be the number of all such nodes. Then,

$$E[L] = E \left[\sum_v I\{H(u) < H(v) < J\} \right] = \sum_v \Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J] = \text{infl}(u).$$

But L cannot exceed $J - \min(H(u), J)$, so

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{infl}(u) &= E[L] \leq E[J] - E[\min(H(u), J)] \\
&= E[J] (1 - \Pr[H(u) \geq J]) && \text{(by Lemma 1)} \\
&= E[J] \Pr[H(u) < J] \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha} \text{rep}(u).
\end{aligned}$$

For part (v), we split walks that hit v before jumping into those that hit u first and those that don't:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{rep}_G(v) &= \Pr_G[H(v) < J] \\
&= \Pr_G[H(u) < H(v), H(v) < J] + \Pr_G[H(u) \geq H(v), H(v) < J] \\
&= \text{infl}_G(u, v) + \Pr_G[H(u) \geq H(v), H(v) < J]
\end{aligned}$$

The event $[H(u) \geq H(v), H(v) < J]$ is determined by time $H(u)$, and hence it is u -invariant. By the above, $\Pr[H(u) \geq H(v), H(v) < J]$ is equal to $\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v)$, and repeating the calculation for G' gives $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) = \text{infl}_{G'}(u, v) + \text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v)$. \square

4.1 Manipulating the Rankings

The previous results quantify how much node u can manipulate reputation *values*, but often we are more concerned with how much u can manipulate the ranking, specifically, how far u can advance by manipulating outlinks only. The following two corollaries follow easily, and are proved in the appendix. Suppose $\text{rep}_G(u) < \text{rep}_G(v)$ and u manipulates outlinks to produce $G' \in \mathcal{N}_u(G)$. We say that u *meets* v if $\text{rep}_{G'}(u) = \text{rep}_{G'}(v)$, and u *surpasses* v if $\text{rep}_{G'}(u) > \text{rep}_{G'}(v)$.

Corollary 2. *Node u cannot surpass a node that is at least twice as reputable.*

Corollary 3. *Node u can meet or surpass at most $\frac{1}{\alpha\gamma}$ nodes that are more reputable than u by a factor of at least $(1 + \gamma)$.*

4.2 Reputation and Influence of Sets

We have discussed reputation and influence in terms of individual nodes for ease of exposition, but all of the definitions and results generalize when we consider the reputation and influence of sets of nodes. Let $U, W \subseteq V$, and recall that $H(W) = \min_{w \in W} H(w)$ is the hitting time of the set W . Then we define $\text{rep}(W) = \Pr[H(W) < J]$ to be the reputation of W , we define $\text{infl}(U, W) = \Pr[H(U) < H(W) < J]$ to be the influence of U on W , and we define $\text{infl}(U) = \sum_{v \in V} \text{infl}(U, \{v\})$ to be the total influence of U . With these definitions, exact analogues of Theorem 2 and its corollaries hold for any $U, W \subseteq V$, with essentially the same proofs. Note that U and W need not be disjoint, in which case it is possible that $H(U) = H(W)$. We omit further details.

4.3 Sybils

In online environments, it is often easy for a user to create new identities, called *sybils*, and use them to increase her own reputation, even without obtaining any new inlinks from non-sybils. A wide class of reputation systems is vulnerable to sybil attacks [5], and, in the extreme, hitting time can be heavily swayed as well. For example, if u places enough sybils so the random walk almost surely starts at a sybil, then adding links from each sybil to u ensures the walk hits u by the second step unless it jumps. In this fashion, u can achieve reputation almost $1 - \alpha$ and drive the reputation of all non-sybils to zero. We'll see that this is actually the *only* way that sybils can aid u , by gathering restart probability and funneling it towards u . So an application can limit the effect of sybils by limiting the restart probability granted to new nodes. In fact, applications of hitting time analogous to Personalized PageRank [22] and TrustRank [14] are already immune, since they place all of the restart probability on a fixed set of known or trusted nodes. Applications like web search that give equal restart probability to each node are more vulnerable, but in cases like the web the sheer number of nodes requires an attacker to place many sybils to have a substantial effect. This stands in stark contrast with PageRank, where one sybil is enough to employ the 2-cycle self-endorsement strategy and increase PageRank by several times [6].

To model the sybil attack, suppose $G' = (V \cup S, E')$ is obtained from G by a sybil attack launched by u . That is, the sybil nodes S are added, and links originating at u or inside S can be set arbitrarily. All other links must not change, with the exception that those originally pointing to u can be directed anywhere within $S \cup \{u\}$. Let q' be the new restart distribution, assuming that q' diverts probability to S but does not redistribute probability within V . Specifically, if $\rho = \sum_{s \in S} q'(s)$ is the restart probability allotted to sybils, we require that $q'(v) = (1 - \rho)q(v)$ for all $v \in V$.

Theorem 3. *Let $U = \{u\} \cup S$ be the nodes controlled by the attacker u , and let v be any other node in V . Then*

- (i) $\text{rep}_{G'}(u) \leq \text{rep}_{G'}(U) = (1 - \rho)\text{rep}_G(u) + \rho$,
- (ii) $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) \geq (1 - \rho)(\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v))$,
- (iii) $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) \leq (1 - \rho)(\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v) + \text{rep}_G(u)) + \rho$.

Compared with Corollary 1, the only additional effect of sybils is to diminish all reputations by a factor of $(1 - \rho)$, and increase the reputation of certain target nodes by up to ρ .

Proof (Theorem 3). We split the attack into two steps, first observing how reputations change when the sybils are added but no links are changed, then applying Theorem 2 for the step when only links change. Let G^+ be the intermediate graph where we add the sybils but do not change links. Assume the sybils have self-loops so the transition probabilities are well-defined. We can compute $\text{rep}_{G^+}(U)$

by conditioning on whether $X_0 \in V$ or $X_0 \in S$, recalling that $\Pr[X_0 \in S] = \rho$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rep}_{G^+}(U) &= (1 - \rho) \cdot \Pr_{G^+}[H(U) < J \mid X_0 \in V] + \rho \cdot \Pr_{G^+}[H(U) < J \mid X_0 \in S] \\ &= (1 - \rho) \cdot \Pr_G[H(u) < J] + \rho \\ &= (1 - \rho)\text{rep}_G(u) + \rho. \end{aligned}$$

In the second step, $\Pr_{G^+}[H(U) < J \mid X_0 \in V] = \Pr_G[H(u) < J]$ because hitting U in G^+ is equivalent to hitting u in G ; all edges outside U are unchanged, and all edges to U originally went to u . Also the conditional distribution of X_0 given $[X_0 \in V]$ is equal to q , by our assumption on q' . The term $\Pr_{G^+}[H(U) < J \mid X_0 \in S]$ is equal to one, since $X_0 \in S$ implies $H(U) = 0 < J$. A similar calculation gives

$$\text{rep}_{G^+}(v) = (1 - \rho)\text{rep}_G(v) + \rho \cdot \Pr_{G^+}[H(v) < J \mid X_0 \in S] = (1 - \rho)\text{rep}_G(v).$$

The term $\Pr_{G^+}[H(v) < J \mid X_0 \in S]$ vanishes because S is disconnected, so a walk that starts in S cannot leave. Another similar calculation gives $\text{infl}_{G^+}(U, v) = (1 - \rho)\text{infl}_G(u, v)$. Finally, we complete the sybil attack, obtaining G' from G^+ by making arbitrary changes to edges originating in U , and apply Corollary 1 (the version generalized to deal with sets) to G^+ . Parts (i-iii) of this theorem are obtained by direct substitution into their counterparts from Corollary 1. \square

Theorem 3 can also be generalized to deal with sets.

5 Computing Hitting Time

To realize a reputation system based on hitting time, we require an algorithm to efficiently compute the reputation of all nodes. Theorem 1 suggests several possibilities. Recall that $\pi(v)$ is the PageRank of v . Then $E[R_\alpha(v)] = 1/\pi(v)$ can be computed efficiently for all nodes using a standard PageRank algorithm, and the quantity $\Pr[R(v) \geq J]$ can be estimated efficiently by Monte Carlo sampling. Combining these two quantities using Theorem 1 yields $E[H_\alpha(v)]$.

It is tempting to estimate the reputation $\Pr[H(v) < J]$ directly using Monte Carlo sampling. However, there is an important distinction between the quantities $\Pr[R(v) \geq J]$ and $\Pr[H(v) < J]$. We can get one sample of either by running a random walk until it first jumps, which takes about $1/\alpha$ steps. However $\Pr[H(v) < J]$ may be infinitesimal, requiring a huge number of independent samples to obtain a good estimate. On the other hand, $\Pr[R(v) \geq J]$ is at least α since the walk has probability α of jumping in the very first step. If self-loops are disallowed, we obtain a better lower bound of $1 - (1 - \alpha)^2$, the probability the walk jumps in the first two steps. For this reason we focus on $\Pr[R(v) \geq J]$.

5.1 A Monte Carlo Algorithm

In this section we describe an efficient Monte Carlo algorithm to simultaneously compute hitting time for all nodes. To obtain accuracy ϵ with probability at least $1 - \delta$, the time required will be $O(\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon^2 \alpha^2} |V|)$ in addition to the time of one PageRank calculation. The algorithm is:

1. Compute π using a standard PageRank algorithm.⁴ Then $E[R_\alpha(v)] = 1/\pi(v)$.
2. For each node v , run k random walks starting from v until the walk either returns to v or jumps. Let $y_v = \frac{1}{k} \cdot (\# \text{ of walks that jump before returning to } v)$.
3. Use y_v as an estimate for $\Pr[R(v) \geq J]$ in part (i) or (iii) of Theorem 1 to compute $E[H_\alpha(v)]$ or $\Pr[H(v) < J]$.

How many samples are needed to achieve high accuracy? Let $\mu = \Pr[R(v) \geq J]$ be the quantity estimated by y_v . We call y_v an (ϵ, δ) -approximation for μ if $\Pr[|y_v - \mu| \geq \epsilon\mu] \leq \delta$. A standard application of the Chernoff bound (see [21] p. 254) shows that y_v is an (ϵ, δ) -approximation if $k \geq (3 \ln(2/\delta))/\epsilon^2\mu$. Using the fact that $\mu \geq \alpha$, it is sufficient that $k \geq (3 \ln(2/\delta))/\epsilon^2\alpha$. Since each walk terminates in $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ steps in expectation, the total expected number of steps is no more than $\frac{3 \ln(2/\delta)}{\epsilon^2\alpha^2} |V|$.

For massive graphs like the web that do not easily fit into main memory, it is not feasible to collect the samples in step 2 of the algorithm sequentially, because each walk requires random access to the edges, which is prohibitively expensive for data structures stored on disk. We describe a method from [8] to collect all samples simultaneously making efficient use of disk I/O.

Conceptually, the idea is to run all walks simultaneously and incrementally by placing tokens on the nodes recording the location of each random walk. Then we can advance all tokens by a single step in one pass through the entire graph. Assuming the adjacency list is stored on disk sorted by node, we store the tokens in a separate list sorted in the same order. Each token records the node where it originated to determine if it returns before jumping. Then in one pass through both lists, we load the neighbors of each node into memory and process each of its tokens, terminating the walk and updating y_v if appropriate, else choosing a random outgoing edge to follow and updating the token. Updated tokens are written to the end of a new unsorted token list, and after all tokens are processed, the new list is sorted on disk to be used in the next pass.

The number of passes is bounded by the walk that takes the longest to jump, which is not completely satisfactory, so in practice we can stop after a fixed number of steps t , knowing that the contribution of walks longer than t is nominal for large enough t , since $\Pr[R \geq J, J > t] \leq \Pr[J > t] = (1 - \alpha)^t$, which decays exponentially.

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⁴ PageRank algorithms are typically iterative and incur some error. Our analysis bounds the additional error incurred by our algorithm.

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A Proofs

A.1 Lemma 1

Proof. Recall that J is the time of the first success in a sequence of independent trials that succeed with probability α , so $\Pr [J > t] = (1 - \alpha)^t$, and $\Pr [J \leq t] = 1 - (1 - \alpha)^t$.

$$\begin{aligned}
E[\min(X, J)] &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Pr[\min(X, J) > t] \\
&= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \Pr[\min(X, J) > t \mid X = x] \\
&= \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Pr[\min(x, J) > t] && \text{(using independence)} \\
&= \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \sum_{t=0}^{x-1} \Pr[J > t] \\
&= \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \sum_{t=0}^{x-1} (1 - \alpha)^t \\
&= \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \frac{1 - (1 - \alpha)^x}{1 - (1 - \alpha)} \\
&= \sum_{x=0}^{\infty} \Pr[X = x] \frac{\Pr[J \leq x]}{\alpha} \\
&= \frac{1}{\alpha} \Pr[X \geq J]
\end{aligned}$$

□

A.2 Lemma 2

Proof. Let $G' \in \mathcal{N}_u(G)$. It is enough to show that $\Pr_G[A \cap [H(u) = t]] = \Pr_{G'}[A \cap [H(u) = t]]$ for all $t \geq 0$. Let $W_{u,t}$ be the set of all walks that first hit u at step t . Specifically, $W_{u,t} = \{w_0 \dots w_t : w_t = u, w_i \neq u \text{ for } i < t\}$. For $w = w_0 \dots w_t$, let $\Pr[w]$ be shorthand for the probability of the walk w :

$$\Pr[w] = \Pr[X_0 = w_0] \Pr[X_1 = w_1 \mid X_0 = w_0] \dots \Pr[X_t = w_t \mid X_{t-1} = w_{t-1}].$$

Then for $w \in W_{u,t}$, the transition probabilities in the expression above are independent of u 's outlinks, so $\Pr_G[w] = \Pr_{G'}[w]$. Finally, since A is determined by time $H(u)$, there is a function $I_A : W_{u,t} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that indicates the occurrence or non-occurrence of A for each $w \in W_{u,t}$. Putting it all together,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr_G[A \cap [H(u) = t]] &= \Pr_G[H(u) = t] \Pr_G[A \mid H(u) = t] \\
&= \sum_{w \in W_{u,t}} \Pr_G[w] I_A(w) \\
&= \sum_{w \in W_{u,t}} \Pr_{G'}[w] I_A(w) \\
&= \Pr_{G'}[A \cap [H(u) = t]]
\end{aligned}$$

□

A.3 Corollary 2

Proof. Suppose $\text{rep}_G(v) \geq 2 \cdot \text{rep}_G(u)$, then $\text{rep}_{G'}(v) \geq \text{rep}_G(v) - \text{infl}_G(u, v) \geq \text{rep}_G(v) - \text{rep}_G(u) \geq 2 \cdot \text{rep}_G(u) - \text{rep}_G(u) = \text{rep}_G(u) = \text{rep}_{G'}(u)$.

A.4 Corollary 3

Proof. Let $A = \{v : \text{rep}_G(v) \geq (1 + \gamma)\text{rep}_G(u), \text{rep}_{G'}(v) \leq \text{rep}_{G'}(u)\}$ be the set of all nodes with reputation at least $(1 + \gamma)$ times the reputation of u that are met or surpassed by u . Then

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{v \in A} \text{rep}_G(v) &\geq |A|(1 + \gamma)\text{rep}_G(u), \\
\sum_{v \in A} \text{rep}_{G'}(v) &\leq |A|\text{rep}_{G'}(u) = |A|\text{rep}_G(u),
\end{aligned}$$

so $\sum_{v \in A} (\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{rep}_{G'}(v)) \geq \gamma|A|\text{rep}_G(u)$. But by Corollary 1, $\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{rep}_{G'}(v) \leq \text{infl}_G(u, v)$, so

$$\gamma|A|\text{rep}_G(u) \leq \sum_{v \in A} (\text{rep}_G(v) - \text{rep}_{G'}(v)) \leq \sum_{v \in A} \text{infl}_G(u, v) \leq \text{infl}_G(u) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha}\text{rep}_G(u),$$

hence $|A| \leq \frac{1}{\alpha\gamma}$.

□